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Eun Kyong Shin
My dissertation, The Morphology of Resistance: Korean Resistance Networks
1895-1945, develops a theory of resistance. Investigating the dynamics of collec-
tive resistance, this study focuses on people who decisively resisted an unwanted
authority; colonial Korea is the empirical locus. Despite the prevalence of resis-
tant movements thoughout our history, very little is known about the relational
structure of resistant movements. Thus, my dissertation fills that lacuna in the
literature. The focal question is how less powerful and less equipped colonized
people organized and sustained collective resistance. Building on the accumu-
lated knowledge from the social movement theory, studies of secret societies
and a social network perspective, my dissertation advances a structural under-
standing of resistance movements and covert social networks. I have conceived
my dissertation in four empirical components. First, my study focuses on rela-
tional structures of the Korean resistance movement from 1895 to 1945. Using
an innovative prosopographical network method, I capture the historical trajec-
tory of the morphology of resistance, providing structural accounts of Korean
resistance movements. Next, I statistically examine the structural conditions
that enable large-scale mobilization under the conditions of severe repression.
Proposing a theory of network visibility highlighting structural heterogeneity
and network fragmentation, I demonstrate the ways in which network visibility
operates for covert mobilization. Comparing the March 1st Movement (MFM)
in 1919 and the June 10th Movement (JTM) in 1926, I next consider why the
MFM mobilization was remarkably successful than the JTM. I argue that the es-
calated insurgency of the MFM can only be explained by the specific structural
conditions for mobilization. Then, my study shifts focus to the demobilization
process. What are the structural mechanisms that can explain the evolution and
devolution of resistance movements? I empirically show different dynamics for
movement mobilization and demobilization. Lastly, I examine the Provisional
Government of Korea, which operated from 1919 to 1945 in Shanghai, China,
as a case of a successful covert organization. By systematically allocating risk
on the margin and to the members who have shorter experience, the covert or-
ganization protected the core members and secured their resistance resilience.
As a result of these analyses, my dissertation contributes to understand of both
resistant movements and covert social networks. The lessons learned from the
Korean case help make sense of other cases of covert collective action.
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“We know it is not a uniform world, and it still contains subjected peoples, some
of whom have acquired a false independence, others who are fighting to conquer
their sovereignty, and yet other who have won their freedom, but who live under
the constant threat of imperialist aggression. These differences are born out of
colonial history, in other words, oppression.”
Jean-Paul Sartre, 1961 Preface in the Wretched of the Earth
1 Overview
The study of large-scale resistance movements made up of ordinary people under
repressive regimes has much to contribute to the contemporary political stage, be-
cause resistance movements have become iconic phenomena of not only the 20th
but also the 21st century. Dynamics of resistance help provide a key underpinning
and drive turning points in history. Therefore unpacking these dynamics is critical
for understanding the development of political systems and their horizons.
Although scholars have provided explanations for conditions of resistance and
revolution, the structure of resistance itself is understudied. Whether such move-
ments are civil or violent, their structural properties are opaque. The clandestine
nature of resistance movements makes the task fundamentally challenging. Re-
bellious insurgencies tend to have less formal structure than other types of move-
ments, and they usually operate against and hide from larger institutional systems,
rendering the act of capturing their social structure a challenging one.
Although a large-scale mobilization under the threat of severe repression is
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difficult, and success is particularly unlikely where civil society is weak, counter
examples abound. As with the Arab Spring, Turkey’s Gezi Park protests, and
other recent resistance movements, questions regarding unpredicted civil upris-
ings against authoritarian regimes urge us to rethink existing theories that describe
a weak state and a strong civil society as favorable conditions for revolution. How
can we make sense of large-scale resistance movements against the superior force
of a strong state?
Regarding this question, Korean colonial resistance movements are a fruitful
case to investigate. With the advent of Japanese colonial rule in the 20th century,
Korea entered into an era of direct rule by a foreign power, which had not experi-
enced since the 14th century (Hwang 2010). Japanese rule over Korea eventually
ended with the end of WWII. Yet, the Korean resistance movement was not a
simple struggle for independence. Rather, it overlaid a long political transition
from a monarchy to a democracy, from the Joseon Dynasty to the Republic of Ko-
rea. A remarkably large number of people participated in the Korean resistance
movement (Eckert et al. 1990; Sin 2001; Hwang 2010). In general, large-scale
mobilization under the threat of severe repression is difficult (Jenkins and Per-
row 1977; Tilly 1978) and is particularly unlikely where civil society is weak
(Migdal 1988). While Koreans began their emancipatory journey with little civic
experience, citizens from all different regions came together to participate in it
and bring it to fruition. Moreover, the movement’s composition was remarkably
heterogeneous, and different participants came with different hopes (Sin 2001).
Members of the Righteous Army desperately desired the restoration of the em-
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peror and empress, while members of the provisional government passionately
craved a modern democratic nation. Christian leaders prayed to God, while Bud-
dhist monks chanted for the mercy of the Buddha. Farmers joined the army, while
merchants threw bombs at unwanted authorities. People who had never received a
formal education marched down the streets with those who held doctoral degrees
from overseas institutions of higher education.
The Korean case gives rise to two puzzles: how these movements were suc-
cessful in achieving large-scale mobilizations even though late-19th century Korea
lacked a robust civil society, and how these movements formed such a cohesive
structure even though they were drawn from such a heterogeneous group of peo-
ple. These puzzles leads to my central research question: How were Korean resis-
tance movements enabling mobilization of large numbers of diverse people over
half a century?
This thesis is a voyage in search of answers to this question and the key arises
from the interpersonal relations. This dissertation explores the role of social re-
lationships in the context of collective defiance. I focus on understanding how
ordinary Koreans organized sustainable resistance movements against Japanese
penetration (1895-1910) and imperial rule (1910-1945). The prevailing theories of
Korean resistance movements tend to focus on the international atmosphere of the
era – revolutions in the neighboring countries (Ban 1998) and discourses on rights
to self-determination (Baldwin 1969; Manela 2007) – as well as a deep animosity
toward Japanese authority (Wells 1989; Hatada 1969). The former encouraged
colonized Koreans to strive for more political opportunities, while the latter built
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an emotional foundation for mobilization against Japanese rule. Conventional the-
ories of political opportunity and emotional motivation are unquestionably helpful
in explaining Korean resistance movements, but these explanations are insufficient
for explaining how large-scale mobilization succeeded despite Korean society’s
weak civil foundation and the authoritarian regime’s intense repression. In order
to address this surge of collective action that opposed the Japanese in a supposedly
weak civil society, I focus my research on the constitutive process of resistance.1
Resistance is not imposed but immanent. Heated international politics cannot
be transplanted into a domestic political context without a receptive local body.
Nor is animosity among the suppressed conceived in a vacuum. Resistors pen-
etrated their societies with active tentacles to transplant defiance and cultivate
animosity. Without understanding these resistors, the apparent paradox of the un-
likely insurgency cannot be resolved. Studying the anatomy of the main actors is
crucial for understanding how the international atmosphere of the era and the emo-
tional foundation actually fostered the formation of Korean collective resistance.
Hence, the present dissertation focuses on the resistance movement’s participants
from the period of Japanese penetration until the end of imperial rule and unpacks
how the structures of interpersonal relationships of the participants contributed to
their solidarity.
1 Whether the Korean civil society was actually weak or not might be debatable depends on how
one defines civicness. There are two compelling reasons to argue that Korean society in late-19th
century would have a weak civil society. First, the majority of Korean people had extremely
limited, if not zero, experiences in civil and political engagement. Second, the civil and private
associations were extremely prohibited during imperial rule. I discuss in more detail about this
issue in the following chapter.
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Korean resistance movements that took place before and during the Second
World War employed both violent and nonviolent methods and operated under the
auspices of different groups within and outside of the Korean Peninsula (Duus
1998; Eckert et al. 1990; Hwang 2010; Kim 1975; Kim 2005; McKenzie 1919).
These movements were a case of collective defiance during a period marked by
political uncertainty, rapid economic transition, and social turmoil. The key task
of the resistance movements was to maintain the structural strength necessary to
sustain ongoing efforts to undermine Japanese imperial authority. While a well-
documented historiography exists, very little is known about the structure of the
Korean resistance movements.
2 Theoretical Foundation
The main question with which I start this study is how do relational mechanisms
of a large-scale collective action operate, especially under repressive conditions.
While the substantive focus of the dissertation is historical, I identify exportable
social processes that zoom into relational structures of large-scale collective ac-
tion. These processes are related to three theoretical subfields in sociology: social
networks, social movements and collective action. Within the discipline of so-
ciology, these subfields interact and intersect in interesting ways. My research
question comes out of a recent development in the intersection of these fields,
specifically focusing on advances made in the understanding of covert social net-
works and high-risk social movements in the light of the relational perspective.
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In this section, I discuss the threads from existing literature and present coher-
ent framework that can help to situate the present study in a broader perspective.
I first situate research on social networks and social movements. I start with an
assumption that collective action is inherently embedded in social relations, focus-
ing my discussion of the literature on lines of research that investigate relational
aspects of social movements. Then I turn the discussion to covert collective action
in the context of social movements, where the participation is legally prohibited
and repressed. In reviewing the pertinent literature, I will lay out the theoreti-
cal foundations upon which this dissertation draws and point out the gaps in the
current understandings of covert collective action to which this study contributes.
Identifying mechanisms that operate through resistance movements has its own
value, one that helps provide crucial pieces of the puzzle to make sense of covert
collective action.
2.1 Social Networks and Collective Action
The most fundamental contribution of social network analysis is its capacity to
capture the links between social categories, such as actors, organizations and
even epistemological concepts. Instead of considering such categories as inde-
pendent segments, social network analysis draws attention to their connections.
Accordingly, from a network perspective, social worlds are constructed not by
characteristics of what their components are, but rather how these components are
connected. In other words, stories of interacting how tell more about who these
components are rather than what they are composed of.
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From network perspective, macro structure is often derived from interactions
and relations observed at the micro level. Benefitting from its ability to capture
‘relational components,’ many scholars have actively employed the network per-
spectives to study collective action in general (Gould 1993; Hardin 1982; Marwell
et al. 1988; Marwell and Oliver 1993) and specifically in social movement fields
(Baldassarri and Diani 2007; Diani 1996; Diani 1997; Diani and McAdam 2003;
Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 1991; Gould 1996; Hillmann 2008; Knoke
1990; Knoke 2003; Passy 2001; Livesay 2003; Marsden 1981; Morris and Lang-
man 2002; Snow et al. 1980; Bearman, and Everett 1993; Hedstom 2006).2 Stud-
ies focusing on recruitment and mobilization processes provide rich contextual
details of social network effects on mobilization. To date, scholars have consid-
ered various aspects of collective action processes highlighting questions of how
relational structures evolve and congregate, not only within a network but also
across a group of networks investigating direct and indirect ties. As a result, a
deep understanding of the importance of social networks in movement mobiliza-
tion has been accumulated.
Well-documented evidence in the literature concerning social movement net-
work research shows that how densely participants are connected and how central-
ized the network is are the key structural factors in collective action. Density and
centrality tend to be positively associated with mobilization in general. Dense net-
works are better for recruiting new members (Marwell et al. 1988; Marwell and
2 For a detailed historical review of social movement network literature, see Diani (2013) and
Krinsky and Crossley (2014).
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Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Sandell
1999) and more centralized movements are expected to be more efficient for mo-
bilization (Diani 1997).
2.2 Social Networks and Resistance Movements
However, although relational conditions are crucial to understanding resistance
movements, findings from analyses of overt movements, particularly in demo-
cratic regimes, may not be directly relevant for the context examined here. A
boundary condition problem arises in the direct application of findings across dif-
ferent political settings. Evidence from oppositional movements under authori-
tarian regimes shows that the factors in democratic contexts are not always appli-
cable to non-democratic settings because resistance movements under repressive
regimes are often not only high-risk social movements but prohibited ones. There-
fore the consequential risk is exponentially different from participation in social
movements in democratic regimes.
Collective action in a repressive regime differs from collective action in demo-
cratic contexts (Opp and Gern 1993; Osa 2001; Osa 2003). Morrill and his col-
leagues (2003) argue that covert collective action is distinct from overt collective
action in their undercover nature.3 A growing body of literature suggests that in
3 One may argue that social movement networks themselves are rarely overt, even if the social
movement or protest itself is. However, there is a big difference between signing petitions or
donating money for a cause, and marching against the likelihood to get killed. The stake of
hiding relational links is much higher in the latter case. Therefore, in this study, covert networks
refer to the kind of relational ties that preferably and inevitably need to be concealed.
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explaining collective action in repressive regimes, relational networks also facili-
tate the mobilization processes and play critical role in their maintenance. Schol-
ars have argued that social relations are critical in understanding how people are
mobilized into collective action, yielding insights into why and how some peo-
ple are mobilized for a specific collective action while others are not. When the
expected consequence of collective action is risky, or even legally prohibited, in-
terpersonal relations are even more critical in attracting new participants to join
(Osa 2003).
From both a structural and instrumental perspective, social networks are par-
ticularly important for understanding social mobilization. Social networks pro-
vide an initial disposition to participate (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). The initial
disposure of a certain identity is crucial in becoming a member of a certian group.
Social networks provide opportunity structures and shape decisions, enabling so-
cialization for individuals into a larger group (Passy 2001). In addition social
networks distribute information and resources, providing the basis for being a
collective (Mische 2008; Osa 2003). Especially in nondemocratic regimes, inter-
personal networks provide the fundamental nexus for covert mobilization both to
recruit new participants and to organize protests (Osa 2001; Mische 2008; Opp
and Gern 1993; Pfaff 1996; Petersen 2001; Kitts 2000).
For example, linking the inter-organizational network data collected from 1954
to 1959 and the data from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators
III, 1948-1982, Osa (2001; 2003) analyzes the relationship between resistance
movement networks and levels of protest and repression in Poland. In her esti-
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mates of relational ties, measured by organizational affiliations, Osa finds that in
an authoritarian context, network development among participating organizations
is a critical and enabling apparatus in the affordance of political opportunity. She
shows that there is a positive relation between exisitng organizational ties and the
level of protest in the People’s Republic of Poland.
Zuo and Benford (1995) found similar effects of preexisting network struc-
tures facilitating large-scale social movements in repressive regimes. Analyzing
the outburst of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the authors find that es-
tablished students’ organizational networks and geographical proxy of the par-
ticipating universities fostered students’ riots in Beijing. Despite the deficit in
resources and access to media, student protestors circulated information through
interpersonal networks and preexisting organizational ties, as well as via the built
environment available to them, such as bulletin boards and posters on building
walls.
Loveman (1998) also investigates the relationship between high-risk social
movements in authoritarian regimes. Comparing human rights movements under
the military dictatorship in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, she examines the re-
lationship between network conditions and the level of success of human rights
movements. Analyzing cross-national cases, her study incorporates a rich set of
historical context and finds that the success of the human rights movements in
Chile and the failure in Argentina are associated with social network conditions
of the two countries: The outcome of a social movement varies by the relational
conditions in each country. Particularly in Chile, the heterogeneous personal net-
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works which exited between non-Catholics and Catholic leaders and also amongst
different professionals, lawyers and politicians were the key to enabling the suc-
cess of human rights movements.
Loveman argues that severe state repression which is assumed to be associ-
ated with higher potential risks and expensive costs of collective action invokes
certain types of social movements. Interestingly, dense interpersonal networks
tend to insulate activists, which lead to higher levels of commitment by partici-
pants. Moreover, previously existing ties among participants plays a critical role
in explaining the success of the later waves of activists. From her comparative
historical analysis, she concludes that the success of the early risers reduces the
risks and costs of future mobilizers to join the movement. This study shows that
rebellious networks are distinctive from other types of social movement networks,
particularly in ways which they operate and facilitate mobilization.
2.3 The Clandestine Nature of Covert Networks
Another important line of research stems from the recent studies of underground
high-risk networks, such as terrorist networks or criminal networks, also suggest
a similar distinctive network theory. When it comes to hidden networks, sparsely
connected (Milward and Raab 2006) and decentralized network structures (Ar-
quilla and Ronfeldt 2001) are more effective than dense, highly clustered forms.
As shown in the preceding section, it has been agreed that relational structures
that garner mobilization in repressive regimes would function in distinctive ways
compared to those in less constraint social settings.
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Either in a high-risk social mobilization under repression or gang recruiting
in democratic settings, participants have incentives to decrease awareness of their
participation publicly, rather than overtly announce them. This is a particularly
acute problem if participants face severe punishment when they are caught by
the authorities. If citizens are aware of possible access points to join a covert
collective action, such points of access are likely known to authorities as well.
To secure and maintain its operation, a low level of publicity is required for a
covert collective action, however at the same time in order to survive and grow as
a movement a high level of publicity is effective in recruiting future participants.
While one would not anticipate that task operation and membership growth are
perfectly exclusive from one another, the magnitude of these dilemmas is striking.
Two competing goals of covert collective action – to recruit more participants
and to hide or avoid external legal sanctions – suggest different remedies to its op-
erations. These two mechanisms have different implications for covert networks.
While the former might leave the pulling effects maximized as the visibility grows,
it has the potential to exacerbate the risk to which participants are exposed. The
latter might lead to a higher level of security for existing members, but it has the
potential to further attenuate mobilization success.
To mobilize external participants and resources, existing members of the move-
ment need to reach out to the world outside of the group. Such exposure may lead
consequently to more attention not only from future participants but also from the
authorities, which can easily put participants’ lives in danger. Yet if membership
is limited to those already participating, it is difficult for a movement to grow and
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gain more strength in numbers. Given the high risk associated with the opera-
tion of the resistance movements and covert associations alike, there is a natural
tendency for a shrinking in membership size. The consequence of isolation for
the sake of members’ safety is their loss of access to resources and new potential
participants. Avoiding such negative consequences would entail recruiting and
reaching out externally, but the security of movement members would be sacri-
ficed to some extent.
Such dilemmas have been noted. For example, Morrill and his colleagues
(2003) highlight the important role of visibility in organizing covert collective
action in an organization. The important point is that the visibility of a covert
network has a negative effect on its successful operation (Morrill, Zald and Rao
2003). Defining social visibility as the degree of known to authorities, covert
conflicts such as sabotage campaigns must hide the times and places of actions.
Therefore, the success of a covert operation is constrained by its ability to execute
its actions secretly.
Moreover, Passy (2003) examines evidence that comes from members of two
political organizations in Switzerland, the Bern Declaration and World Wildlife
Fund (WWF), finding that visibility is highly correlated with the risk level of the
collective action. By turning the focus to visibility, Passy brings in the interven-
ing effect of network structures and the larger society in which they are embedded.
Cross-referencing two social dimensions of movement characteristics, legality and
visibility, the author offers four distinct types of social movement organizations.
Laying out four distinctive conditions for mobilization, she analyzes how func-
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tions of social networks vary according to their public visibility, measured by
media exposure.4 In organizations with less public visibility, interpersonal ties of
members are more critical in recruiting prospective members.
Tying these findings back to network structures, while high-density networks
can facilitate the recruitment of potential participants, they easily lead to unwel-
come attention from repressive authorities. Likewise, in a highly centralized net-
work, outsiders can quickly detect central players. As with other underground
networks, resistance movements in repressive contexts must hide their structure
to avoid strong sanctions from various repressive apparatus. Hence, densely con-
nected and highly centralized movement networks have a higher cost of visibility
and are less successful in resistance mobilization. Therefore, as opposed to the
positive association in overt or democratic contexts, the visibility of a resistance
movement network is expected to have a negative effect for its successful opera-
tion.
3 Moving Forward: Covert Network Dynamics
The relationship between relational structure and resistance movements under re-
pressive regimes still remains an intricate puzzle. This section attempts to build
a framework that would identify the theoretical improvement that is in need.
While most scholarship converges on the critical role of social relations in gen-
4 One importatnt distinction must be made here. Publicity may not be a proper measure of the
level of visibilitybecause often formal media exposure is not an availabe option for any kind of
covert or illegal mobilization.
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erating momentum for collective action and large-scale mobilization, there is less
agreement on how high-risk social movement networks operate under repressive
regimes. As the contemporary world is providing ongoing cases of various kinds
among which resistance movements do exist, I argue there is growing need for a
closer examination of extant theories and a more systematic approach on the topic.
Hence, following the findings of scholars who have underscored the importance of
networks for covert collective action, I develop a more comprehensive historical
network analysis tracking covert movement network changes over time and I ad-
dress three distinctive, but inter-related, theoretical contributions this dissertation
advances.
3.1 Structural Factors for High-risk Mobilization: Network
Visibility
So far, this review of the literature leaves us with structural descriptions of the
networks of covert collective action and of the relational structure of in which they
are embedded, but lacks works that address how these two features interact with
each other. In other words, the intervening effects of the structural constellation
of the movement to its external setting remain obscure.
As Melucci (1985) argues, the inherent dilemma of social movements stems
from their nature as action systems. They are systems in that they have structural
constraints where the unity and continuity of the action would not be possible
without integration and interdependence of participants. But they are also not
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merely fixed structures. They are composed of actions in that their structure is
built by various decisions made by individuals at the micro-level. Social move-
ments hence operate in plural settings; one internal world in which participants
build together and one external world in which they are embedded, one which
they try to change. These complex layers of social movements, fluctuating yet
constrained, are embedded in a larger social context.
Confluence points of these two worlds temporarily create a boundary of a
given time point. Individuals join the movements but are also constantly leaving,
creating movement between these worlds. Hence the entry and the exit points are
exposed to the external condition the most. And the lines created by these local
actions of joining and leaving creates windows that ventilate the movements with
the larger society in which they are embedded. Focusing on the group of people
who move across these two boundaries, one can see the intervening dynamics of
these two worlds.5 To be more specific, I develop a theory of network visibility
that focuses on structural fragmentation and heterogeneity, which I elaborate in
Chapter 4.
3.2 Movement Evolution and Devolution: In & Out
Reflecting the latest developments in the field of social network analysis and social
movements, researchers have become more rigorously engaged with temporality,
5 Although some social movements can operate more or less independently from the rest of the
society, it is unrealistic for them to be free from the external constraints where they are operating.
In that, a collective action can’t be fully explained without taking into accounts of how it is
mobilized, how the structures are built and maintained, and how the main functions are assured.
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moving beyond a simple examination of the snapshot at a given time point. Not
only is the question of how the ‘how’ elements are connected to each other im-
portant, but the shifts in their connectivity over time is an important next question
to be answered. This dissertation extends this new research direction. In contrast
to the conventional understanding of segmented social movement stages (emer-
gence, coalescence, bureaucratization/institutionalization and decline (for some
examples, see Blumer1969; Mauss 1975; Tilly 1978; Porta and Diani 2006; Miller
1983), I will focus on the entire period from the evolution and devolution of resis-
tance movements. Although these different stages have distinctive characteristics,
the historical development of collectivity is not a disruptive process by nature.
While the combination of network perspective and social movement literature
has identified a number of important elements regarding processes of movement
evolution, one important aspect of social relations has received surprisingly little
attention: the destruction of relationships (Sandell 1999) and devolution process
of social movements (Koopmans 1993). Relations created by human beings are
neither permanent nor free from termination, as human agents can, in most cases,
decisively terminate any kind of social relations. But just what happens after
mobilization is under-investigated and remains terra in cognita (Koopmans 1993).
Based on his comparative study on protest waves, Koopmans provides sets of
hypothesis on movement decline. He argues that social movements will split over
strategy and that civic and radical groups become increasingly separated.6 Over
6 However, this is not the case for the Korean resistance movements and I will discuss this issue
in Chapter 3.
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time this separation will have a negative effect on the overall movement.
Acknowledging the importance of temporality, Sandell (1999) also argues that
one-sided research on collective action is not sufficient to explain this complex
process of collective action processes. The result of this unbalanced view on social
movements is that a lack of knowledge on demobilization processes may interfere
with our ability to accurately measure and explain social movement processes
overall. To understand the dynamics of collective processes, research should en-
compass both the emergence and dissolution of social networks, explaining not
just mobilization but what happens after mobilization as well. As a result, one
major missing piece of the puzzle is longitudinal change and covering both join-
ing and leaving processes altogether.
3.3 Different Functions of Network Localities
Focusing on the nature of being covert, a fundamental difference between resis-
tance movements and other social movements is the severe risk and high cost as-
sociated with participation. In examining risk associated with a resistance move-
ment, I highlight relations between vulnerability and structural locality. Social
networks rarely exhibit uniform structural characteristics. Empirical networks are
multi-faceted and clustered in unique ways, as compared to randomly generated
networks. Therefore, I focus on how distinct sections of a network are related
to the stimulation and obstruction of mobilization. In other words, by examining
structural divergences within a covert network, I aim to provide more accurate
stories of how a network operates (as opposed to examining more basic structural
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characteristics). I argue that risk of action is differentiated by the locality of the
actor. Mobilization to and demobilization from the core have distinct costs and
risks compared to the periphery.
The recent resurgence of interest in associational secrecy is a result of current
interest in criminal organizations, particularly terrorist networks. The rise of ter-
rorism draws attention to clandestine alliance (Gibbs 1989; Oberschall 2004; Turk
2004). Accordingly, a large number of studies have sought to understand terrorist
networks (Sageman 2004; Tsvetovat and Carley 2005; Moody 2005; Lindelauf et
al. 2009; Krebs 2002; Raab and Milward 2003; Mishal et al. 2005). These studies
share an assumption that external threat influences the structure of covert organi-
zations as a whole, but do not explain exactly how structure is related to external
threat. To answer the question of how covert organizations secure their resilience,
I investigate relations between structural heterogeneity and mobilization and fur-
ther examine risk distribution among members of a covert organization and its
relations to detection by an external authority.
A growing number of recent studies have demonstrated that covert and overt
social networks function differently (Klerks 2001; Krebs 2002; Carley 2006; Lin-
delauf et al. 2009; Raab and Milward 2003; Sageman 2004; Sageman 2008;
Weinberg et al. 2004; Mishal and Rosenthal 2005; Enders and Su 2007). Given
the exponentially growing body of literature, playing-hard-to-get works for soci-
ologists, criminologists, political scientists, policy makers and military officers as
well. Ubiquitously beginning with acknowledgements of the difficulty in secur-
ing the data, various aspects of the covert networks have been discussed ranging
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from descriptive scholarship on their structural features to their efficacy. The main
problem in the filed arises not from the lack of studies but from the lack of con-
sensus among the scholars and hence the conflicting findings from the existing
literature.
For example, the existing literature does not agree, or offer much of a con-
sensus, on the basic structural features of covert networks. Krebs (2002) shows
that the average path length is 4.75 amongst 9/11 related terrorists. However, Xu
and Chen (2008) argue that the terrorists in the Global Salafi Jihad network data,
which is provided by Sageman (2004), are on average only 2.5 links away from
Bin Laden himself. Although these two studies investigate similar populations
and activities, their estimations of network structures are strikingly different.
Continuing with this example, the question of what sort of network structure
is the best fit, or most effective, for achieving terrorist activities is also far from
settled. According to a special report on Al Qaeda published by the United States
Military Academy, decentralized terrorist organizations are less vulnerable to hi-
erarchically organized governmental security forces (Felter et al. 2006). Densely
connected networks are thought to have low resilience (Zawodny 1978), such a
chain structure argued to be especially appropriate for stealthy economic transac-
tion (Lesser et al. 1999). Yet while some scholars demonstrate that when covert
networks are small, short path lengths and a sparsely connected network structure
is more resilient against external detection (Xu and Chen 2008), others empha-
size the importance of a hierarchical order in terrorist networks (Memon et al.
2008). This corner of the literature maintains that a connected stars shape reaches
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is most resilient, with optimal efficiency (Gutfraind 2010). Little congruence has
achieved in this line of research.
Three problems associated with data availability may have influenced the cur-
rent discord in scholarly understandings of covert networks. First, empirical evi-
dence often conflicts with each other but fails to dismiss any counterparts, due to
the lack of data reliability. Undoubtedly, court records or lists of those arrested
as reported in newspapers or police documents reveal the identities of those who
were participating in covert networks (Krebs 2002, Demiroz and Kapucu 2012).
But what becomes visible here is only the tip of the iceberg, and even when it is
visible, such populations are no longer part of a hidden structure. Cutouts offer
glimpses into what the remaining, hidden structure might look like, but it remains
difficult to make any precise, let alone legitimate, inferences, for the larger struc-
ture remains, so to speak, under the water. Therefore, this type of data collection
risks capturing the structures of detection not the covert networks themselves.
More importantly, there is little discussion of the risk, which is the elephant
in the room. In the few studies that do take risk into account, such factors are
not rigorously imputed (Carley 2006). Obviously, it is challenging to empirically
capture and measure the variance of external threats. In reality, data only exists
on those who have already been arrested and exposed to authorities, hindering
scholars to comprehend where exactly risk is concentrated in covert networks.
Although many scholars have studied what kind of network structures lead net-
works to optimize their operations without sacrificing their structural efficacy, the
external threat is treated as a given. In this way, the selection of the case serves as
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a surrogate to control secrecy and external threat.
Lastly, the adaptability of covert networks burdens researchers, as the time
should be seriously taken. Network volatility can enable observers to arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions, depending especially on where and when the observer takes
the snap shot. Hence, especially in studies of illicit networks, the process of struc-
turing deserves more attention, with data collection covering multiple time points
to capture a wider range of dynamics.
In sum, under strict prohibition of organized dissent, interpersonal networks
including family ties, friendship ties, kinship ties, and coworker ties become a
politically important and powerful foundation for mobilization. The recruitment
of trusted compatriots for resistance is mainly facilitated through intense interper-
sonal relations by virtue of the clandestine nature of the covert collective action.
However, despite its critical role in resistance mobilization, the relational struc-
ture of participation in resistance movements remains less known. Furthermore,
the data collection of covert networks is not only hard-to-get but also extremely
demanding. The availability of reliable data is the main problem to advancing
more sophisticated theories of covert networks, impeding scholarship’s ability to
move toward fruitful knowledge accumulation. Therefore, an explicit focus on
how risk affects the covert network structure is a critical question that remains to
be answered with reliable data sets. Bearing this laundry list in mind, the focal
interest of this dissertation is to address the robustness and vulnerability of covert
network structures.
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4 Longitudinal Prosopographical Network Analysis
To investigate the intersection of social relations and historical events in the Ko-
rean resistance movement, I have drawn on a key primary source: biographies of
the participants.7 These biographies allowed me to reconstruct the movement’s
relational structure in connection with a wide range of historical sources, includ-
ing government records, newspaper articles, journals, and letters. Biography is the
written history of an individual in the form of a series of actions: being born, grow-
ing up, attending schools, getting a job, and going through the ups and downs of
life. This series of actions involves other people who are significant to the individ-
ual. Biographies furnish researchers with crucial information about individuals–
networks, along with precise time records, and are fruitful resources for longitu-
dinally reconstructing social relations as a result. I have drawn on rich stories of
participants to reconstruct the relational structure of the resistance movement. 8
Without a doubt, my access to the hidden records of this covert social move-
ment was made possible by changes in historical assessments of the participants.
These Korean resistance movements were illegal, vigorously repressed by the
7 Surely, this work is in line with the effort to overcome the deep cleavage between the qualitative
and quantitative methods in social science. Hence, it should be noted that other methodologi-
cal approaches in sociology share a similar line of concern. For example, quantitative narrative
analysis uses the linguistic properties of texts to perform similar types of analysis. Due to prac-
tical constraints, this thesis does not provide a comprehensive review of quantitative narrative
analysis, but for further discussions of narratives and networks, see: Sudhahar et al. (2011) and
Bearman et al. (2000).
8 The transformation of qualitative narratives into numeric or graphical matrices doesn’t come
without cost. Detailed stories cannot be fully included in the analysis, and the research should
mount a filter depends on the question at the stake.
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colonial ruler. But since Korea gained independence, the once fervent rebels, long
persecuted and oppressed, have been remembered as national heroes. In other
words, after independence, this once hidden population was exposed to new his-
torical light, and their records began to surface. Due to such changes in historical
assessment, we now have various new access points to the past.9
Sociologists have long used prosopography, the systematic study of collec-
tions of biographies (for example, Merton 1938; Bearman 1993; Padgett and
Ansell 1993). Detailed individual life stories often shed much light on impor-
tant historical events, such as the signing of the Constitution (Beard 1913) and
large-scale revolutions (Syme 1963). I use prosopographical methods in order to
conduct rigorous social network analysis. My analysis focuses particularly on the
relational information in biographies: who did what, with whom, and when. I
used biographies to extract information about participants’ relational social net-
works of the participants. This information was the primary empirical material I
used to analyze my theoretical questions and, in particular, to evidence relational
9 “There is a sense in which we may speak of the Past as changing; that sense in which an event at
t-1 acquires new properties not because we causally operate on that event, nor because something
goes on happening at t-1 after t-1 ceases, but because the event at t-1 comes to stand in different
relationships to events that occur later (Danto 1985:154).” The past cannot be changed, but the
meaning of the past can change. For example, countless numbers of Edison’s inventions were
failures. However, when some of his inventions succeeded, the meaning of his failures changed.
It became possible to argue that they were not mere failures but rather wonderful discoveries of
thousands of approaches that don’t work—important steps along the path of figuring out what
does work. A historian writing in the middle of Edison’s succession of failures could have said
that Edison had failed. It was not false then, but it is now. The factual events of the past did not
change, but their meaning has. However, this changed meaning does not mean that the earlier
historian’s efforts are now invalid, as they give later generations factual information about what
was really happening at the moment. For more detailed discussions of these issue, see Moody
et al. (1999).
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structures among the hidden population of movement participants. A marriage of
the prosopographical method and the social network perspective allowed me to
unveil important structural features of the Korean resistance movement that were
not identifiable through other methods.
5 Organization and Summary of Findings
My analysis of the network structure of Korean resistance movements was moti-
vated by the need for a thorough investigation of the structural aspects of resis-
tance movements and the determinants of their evolution and devolution in light
of recent theoretical developments and empirical work. This dissertation builds
on our knowledge of the effects of social networks by incorporating key insights
from social movement theory - that relational ties provide critical leeway for mo-
bilization, and structural features play important roles in the maintenance of so-
cial movements. I argue that the movement’s relational structure is critical to
understanding resistance movements and that a better way of understanding the
predicament of mobilization and demobilization involves considering how partic-
ipants are linked to one another.
The dissertation includes seven chapters, four of which describe empirical
findings. In this chapter, I have presented a theoretical framework that is gov-
erning the dissertation in an attempt to situate this study in a broader context in
relevant fields. I discuss three theoretical contributions of this dissertation in elab-
orating a structural theory of resistance with important dimensions by adding the
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intervening effects of covert social networks, bringing the demobilization pro-
cess into accounts and systematically investigating functions of structural local-
ities. Chapter 2 begins by laying out the historical background of this research
and looks at how conditions of Korean resistance movements changed over time.
The resistance movements changed over time, and so did the setting in which
the movements took place. Outlining historical details of the Korean resistance
movements, I draw attention to possible weaknesses of extant historical expla-
nations. Based on the historical data set I have compiled, I have been able to
develop four empirical studies that examine four different aspects of the Korean
resistance movements: morphology, mobilization, demobilization, and risk distri-
bution within the resistance networks.
5.1 The Morphology of Resistance
The first empirical chapter examines the structural conditions that make large-
scale mobilization possible under conditions of severe repression. Given the clan-
destine nature of resistance movements and the conditions for their success – most
critically, their ability to hide their structure from the authorities – the structures
of relationships within them are often hidden. Hence, the most salient challenge
of this research is gathering historical data for the overall structure of the Korean
resistance movements: making the invisible visible. To reconstruct the hidden
structure of the Korean resistance movements, I have drawn on a key primary
source, the biographies of the participants. These biographies allowed me to com-
pile relational data from the stories of who did what with whom and when. Using a
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prosopographical method, I explore the cooperative interactions at the individual-
level to construct an overall relational map for each year from 1895 to 1945, yield-
ing a series of network representations covering 1,624 resistance participants from
1895 to 1945.
To answer the question of how the relational structures of the Korean resis-
tance movements changed over time, I trace its morphological trajectory, pre-
senting an overview of changes of the network morphology of the Korean resis-
tance movements from 1895 to 1945. I use sequential network models to pro-
vide a graphical representation of the shifting constellation of resistance groups
and activists, identifying distinctive patterns over different phases of the resis-
tance movement: an archipelago type, a linear shape, a polycentric constellation,
a fragmented globular structure, and a dense globular cluster.
5.2 Network Visibility and Covert Mobilization
The second empirical chapter analytically investigate structural factors that ac-
counts for covert mobilization in conjunction with a comparative study of two
protest events. I statistically examine the structural conditions that enable large-
scale mobilization under the conditions of severe repression. Proposing a model
of structural heterogeneity and network fragmentation, I demonstrate the ways in
which network visibility operates for covert networks. Network visibility is nega-
tively associated with covert mobilization outcomes. Structurally diverse and less
cohesive network structures are positive contributors for successful covert mobi-
lization across different periods of colonial time. This finding not only illustrates
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the critical importance of structure in understanding resistance movements, but
also unpacks the dynamics of contention that changed the constellation of the
covert collective action.
By comparing two cases with different mobilization outcomes, I further artic-
ulate how the particular mobilization process operated in two specific historical
events: the March 1st movement and the June 10th movement. To understand the
drastic difference in their mobilization outcomes despite of the remarkably similar
historical conditions in regard to emotional foundations and international political
opportunity structures, I compare the relational conditions of the two. Based on
this comparative analysis, I find that resistance movement networks are particu-
larly effective when they recruit actors on the periphery of the movement. When
movement networks exhibit internally dense connections, they are less likely to
mobilize the broader population to join the movements. For the successful large-
scale resistance movement, loosely connected networks are effective, particularly
when they have heterogeneous structure and accompany actively mobilizing pe-
ripheries. The successful mobilization was the case where new participants are
connected into the existing networks through the peripheries of the movements in
contrast to the core of the networks. I find that the periphery is of substantial im-
portance within the context of the resistance movement in explaining mobilization
outcome.
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5.3 The Strength of Flat Networks
Next, I turn my focus to demobilization. Building on the social movement net-
work literature, this chapter aims to understand the structural effects of devolu-
tion of resistance movements. Social movement network studies have identified a
number of significant structural effects driving the formation of relations, but one
important aspect of social relations – their dissolution– has received surprisingly
little attention. In a similar vein, devolution processes of social movements are
less rigorously investigated in comparison to mobilization processes. Hence, to
fill the gap in the existing literature, I examine the following research questions:
What are the structural mechanisms that can explain the devolution process of re-
sistance movements? How do structural factors differ in their effects for explain-
ing mobilization and demobilization? Introducing a novel way to capture entire
social movements from their beginning to their end, I empirically show differ-
ent dynamics for movement mobilization and demobilization at different stages
during the 50 years of the Korean resistance movement. Showing how Korean
resistance networks evolved overtime, I identify three important theoretical im-
plications: First, density and size has a negative effect on resistance movement
mobilization and centrality has a negative effect on exit. Second, during the mo-
bilization period, density and centrality negatively affect both entrance and exit.
Lastly, there are significant changes in exiting patterns between mobilization and
demobilization phases. During the mobilization period, density and centrality
have negative and significant effects on desertion but during the demobilization
period, centrality has a significant and positive effect on demobilization. In un-
30
derground (dark) networks, due to the high cost of visibility, closely-knitted and
highly centralized structures are not efficient for mobilization.
5.4 Risk on the Margin
The final empirical chapter takes up the issue of the risk distribution of resistance
movements. I examine the ways how risks are distributed within covert social
networks and identifies mechanisms of persistence for a clandestine organization.
I draw on theories about secret societies and social network perspectives to show
that the apparent irony of a long-term covert movement can be explained by the
uneven distribution of risk in a covert organization. Unpacking risk distribution
provides a richer framework that builds upon the covert social network perspec-
tive and highlights the key mechanisms of resilience for clandestine organizations.
My model employs statistical analysis of the Provisional Government of Korea,
a covert political organization fought against Japanese colonialism from 1919 to
1945; the model predicts two different levels of risk. At the organizational level,
the risk of losing members due to an exogenous force is predicted by the structural
characteristics of the networks. Density has a negative effect on the group-level
risk. Centralization is positively associated with the level of risk, even after con-
trolling for the size of the network. I test the risk levels of individual members of
the covert organization as functions of personal network size, structural position
within the covert network, and the level of individual experience. By systemat-
ically allocating risk on the margin and to less experienced members, the covert
organization secures its core and maintains its resilience.
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Finally, Chapter 7 draws together the various theoretical and empirical strands
presented in this thesis in a discussion of its contribution and implications. I re-
view the contributions of this extension of network theory and social movement
theory. The main finding of my dissertation is that Korean resistance movement
networks were robust because of their structural diversity. This diversity enhanced
the resistance’s overall strength through differentiated local characteristics. While
the peripheries of these networks were vulnerable to detection and repression, the
periphery’s fragility actually protected the core members of the resistance move-
ments. These structural features helped the Korean resistance movements survive.
6 Contributions
Resistance movements are unresolved and ongoing political phenomena during
not only the 20th but also the 21st century. Whether such movements are civil or
violent, their structural properties remain vague as they are often operating against
an institutional system, tending to be less formal and rendering the act of capturing
their social structure a challenging task. A close examination of the dynamics of
the Korean resistant movement’s social structure provides meaningful references
to other resistant movements, especially from the structural aspect, and answers a
fundamental question on the nature of collective action as well.
This chapter has dealt with the theoretical bases on which my argument of
a social dimension in covert collective action is built. The present study of the
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Korean resistance movement explicitly examines two dimensions associated with
collective action: The mobilization process and the demobilization process. The
former contribution coops into the elaboration of the existing theories and the
contribution from the latter attempts to fill the lacuna in the literature. The main
theoretical thrust of my arguments thus far has been to demonstrate how an ap-
preciation of network analysis can illuminate relational structures of large-scale
resistance movements in a novel way.
Building on existing literature, this study makes three distinct contributions.
First, examining an extreme case of high-risk social movement, I expand the dis-
cussion to the extreme high-risk social movement, which helps us to understand
the resistance movement in specific and collective action in general. Second, by
longitudinally looking at a movement from its emergence to its extinction, I aim
to provide deeper historical analysis and more dynamic narratives about covert
collective action. Lastly, I specify the mechanisms of structural effects of covert
networks to which little attention has been paid, and to which there still remains
less that is known. The available literature on the relationship between social net-
works and social movements takes a less rigorous look into how different local
structures are associated with micro-level actions. Instead of treating the network
as a whole, I move one step further by examining how structural position and
location are systematically differentiated in high-risk social movements.
To recap, the phenomenon in which I am interested is structural visibility and
heterogeneity and their relations to micro actions. Quantitative and also qualitative
studies have documented these kinds of dilemmas in covert collective action as
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discussed above. However, these findings have not yet been evaluated in a rigorous
manner. In this study, I take advantage of the unique features of my data set
to examine how relational structures of high-risk covert collective action operate
and investigate the implications of the structural features of the network for the
collective action processes of resistance movements. In the following section, I
describe the history of the Korean resistance movements in order to draw attention
to the weakness of the existing historical arguments.
This is the first study to undertake a longitudinal analysis of social relations
within a large-scale resistance movement. With this dissertation project, I con-
struct a unique historical network dataset. Based on collective individual biogra-
phies, longitudinal network matrix will be generated. From 1895 to 1945, over
51 years of interactional network data will be constructed from 1,624 individuals.
Not only macro level networks but also individual matrices are available. Given
the urgent need for ‘historical’ network data, this dataset is a valuable empirical
contribution to network researchers and scholars interested in social movements.
Furthermore, methodologically, I contribute to the community of historians who
are interested in computational historical methods.
The primary goal of this thesis is to understand the structural components of
collective resistance and, therefore, contribute to the field of social movement
theory. My research contributes to a longstanding paradigm that considers social
relations as the key to understanding individual participation in collective action
and further expands our knowledge of collective action directly incorporating the
demobilization process into accounts. I draw on social movement theory and a so-
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cial network perspective to show that the historical focus on resistance movements
has left the relevant relational structure understudied. This approach brings struc-
ture into our understanding of resistance movements and so opens a new direction
for empirical study of high-risk collective action.
My theoretical contributions to the existing literature are three folds: adding an
extreme case study, expanding the scope beyond mobilization, and close examina-
tion of differential structural effects for a covert collective action. Exploring the
relational mechanisms that made this unlikely social uprising possible, the case
of Korean resistance movements addresses the general problem of understanding
the social processes behind the making of large-scale collective action. It is also
historically situated in such a way as to shed light on the particular path of evo-
lution that led to the succeeding spillover in neighboring countries under imperial
intrusion. An analysis of the hidden structure of resistance networks can tell us
something about moments that carry the weight of political breakthroughs.
Last but not least, this study also contributes to the existing Korean historiog-
raphy. By unveiling the unseen relational structures that evolves over 51 years of
resistance, the present dissertation enriches the narratives of resistance efforts that
survived a half century. On the basis of the evidence currently provided in this
dissertation, it seems fair to suggest that continuity of those upheavals from the
less powerful colonized Koreans can be better understood by relational networks
of the participants.
According to Skocpol, the primary challenge in historical sociology is to me-
diate between evidence of local patterns and conclusions about national-level pro-
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cesses (1984). By making these connections visible, I strive to unpack mecha-
nisms of resistance, and in particular, the hidden structure of a large-scale resis-
tance movement and its morphological changes over a half-century. Hence this
study contributes to the general theory of resistance and covert collective action.
In the next section, I articulate the theoretical foundations of the study and its






1 Preludes to Modernization
As a late arrival to the task of modernization, Korea underwent extreme histor-
ical turmoil after the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Its Joseon dy-
nasty (Korean Monarch from 1392 to 1897) had been in power continuously for
more than five hundred years, but it began to come apart in the mid-nineteenth
century, with the process of dissolution particularly escalating in the century’s
closing decades.10 Foreign powers, including the Netherlands, the United States,
England, Russia, and Japan, increasingly began to arrive on Korea’s three shores,
as well as its territorial boundary at the north, seeking to benefit from the Korean
peninsula’s economic modernization project.
The door to modernization had been locked for more than five hundred years,
and its opening was accompanied by creaking and straining. The Joseon dynasty
wanted to preserve its tradition and tried to survive the turmoil by tightening
its relations with China’s Qing Dynasty. The seclusion policy launched by the
Daewongun was simple: “No treaties, no trade, no Catholics, no West, and no
Japan” (Cummings 2005). This policy was enforced vigorously during his re-
gency (1863–1873) and led to persecution of many of the Christians and foreign-
ers who landed on Korea’s shores (Conroy 1960), as well as stubborn rejection of
many of the early requests to open the Korean Peninsula to foreign trade.
These protection efforts were neither as plausible nor as successful as the Dae-
wongun might have expected. Neither the effort to cut off all foreign powers nor
10 Notes on translated and romanized names are included in Appendix A at the end of this chapter.
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the effort to solidify longstanding relations with China fit comfortably with the
rapidly changing situation in Asia. The Joseon dynasty faced the failure of its
seclusion policy not only because of armed pressure from foreign powers, but
also because of emerging internal discontent. Foreign powers, especially Japan,
were not willing to idly stand by while China gained privileges over the Korean
peninsula. And internally, many Confucian literati began to argue for indepen-
dence from China.
In addition to these external pressures, domestic political disputes had aggra-
vated as well. The tension of this internal segmentation first became clear when
political elites began to argue that Korea should become a politically independent
nation. As a result of the geographical proximity of China and Korea and their
incredible inequality of power, the Joseon dynasty had long been influenced by
China. But at the end of the nineteenth century, literati who had been exposed
to Western liberalism raised concerns about this longstanding dependency. The
Coup d’Etat of 1884 was the clearest example of the effort to seek “real” inde-
pendence from China. This internal turbulence was quickly repressed and so only
lasted three days, but it succeeded at raising concerns about broader social is-
sues, including political corruption, the class system, diplomatic relations with
China, and modernization. Hence domestically, the Korean populace first began
to actively and extensively experience contentious politics in the late nineteenth
century.
Moreover, it was not just the upper echelon of the Korean society that was
speaking out politically; political dissonance was gushed out from the subjected
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people at the bottom of the social strata. The pivotal example was the Donghak
Peasant Movement, which out broke in 1894 against the Empress Myeongseong.
Donghak was a neo-Confucian academic movement founded by Cheo Je-u. Influ-
enced by Donghak, participants in the peasant movement asked for the demolition
of the slavery system and the class system, lower taxes, an end to political corrup-
tion, and a distribution of land to all peasants. They severely criticized Korea’s
longstanding class system, which divided the population into Yangban (the tra-
ditional ruling class), Jungin (a privileged class mostly composed of government
employees), Sangmin (commoners, including peasants, laborers, and merchants)
and Cheonmin (vulgar commoners). Internally, then, Korea was seeing an out-
burst of accumulated grudges over heavy taxes, economic inequality, and preva-
lent bribery among government officials.
While Korea was undergoing this economic, political, and social upheaval, it
also entered into a new stage of struggle with Japan. During and after the military
leadership of the Meiji period (1868-1912), Japan’s modernization efforts brought
about a seismic shift in East Asia. Japan, a nation that had long been neglected
as a peripheral country, became both the most powerful imperial player in Asia
and a major threat to other countries. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan began to
imperialize a large part of the Asian continent, which caused a convulsive political
restructuring in East Asia.
Japan was late in joining the imperial competition, but its leaders aimed to
build an Asian empire. In this project, Japan wanted Korea as a bridge to over-
come its geographic vulnerability as an isolated country. Because of Korea’s ge-
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ographic proximity and Japan’s desire for a bridge to the Asian continent, the
Korean peninsula became Japan’s most important colonial acquisition. Accord-
ingly, Japan implemented more direct and aggressive control over Korea than over
its other protectorates.
2 Emergence of the Korean Resistance Movement
from 1895 to 1905
The Japanese government began actively penetrating Korea after the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894–95 (Vinacke 1967; Myers and Peattie 1984; Duus 1998).11 From the
Koreans’ perspective, the penetration experience was dramatically propelled in
the early morning of October 8, 1895. Japanese squads broke into the Korean
Palace and assassinated Empress Myeongseong. Because the Joseon dynasty was
deeply rooted in Confucianism, the emperor and empress were symbolized as the
father and mother of the nation. Thus, the assassination of the empress prompted
anti-Japanese sentiment across the nation, and public reaction went beyond mere
contempt.
Resistance groups began to emerge even in the earliest stages of Japan’s intru-
sion. Many Confucian literati organized militia groups that together were called
the “Righteous Army.” For example, Ahn Chang-sik, one of militia, was arrested
in December 1985 while he was mobilizing a local militia troop. During the in-
11 The penetration can be traced back to Kanghwa treaty of 1876 but after the winning of the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the project got explicit and expediated.
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terrogation, he argued that “The empress who reigned for 30 years was killed by
the enemy. If you call me a rebel because I want to revenge the enemy, then is
the enemy who killed the nation’s mother the royalist?”12 This is a common mo-
tivation of the early participants. They were royal to the Joseon dynasty and the
royalty to the existing monarchy was the main driving force for organizing local
militia troops to fight against Japan.
These militia groups engaged in active armed resistance in all different regions
of Korea. Their armaments could not even compare to the Japanese counterparts,
and in their early phases, most participants came from the ruling class, which had
little experience in armed conflict. Gradually, however, political elites opened the
Righteous Army to participation by local citizens regardless of social class.
The penetration period lasted from 1895 to 1905. During this time, Japan
closely monitored local dissent and competed with other imperial powers, such as
China and Russia. Primarily, however, Japan was focusing less on absorbing Ko-
rea politically and more on exploiting it economically. Japanese foreign policy of
this period is often compared to the opening of Japan by the United States (Conroy
1960: 138). In other words, Japan tried to secure its position as the “first friendly
nation” to Korea. In addition, Japan needed to take a careful approach to Korea,
due to the Great Principle of Japan’s foreign policy that had been announced in
the 1880s. According to the principal, the Japanese Foreign Office had declared
that Japan was interested in neither the conquest of Korea nor the reform of Korea.
Therefore, to take over Korean sovereignty, Japan needed at least seemingly
12 Excerpts from his biography.
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peaceful conveyance from Korea to Japan. In December 1903, the Japanese cab-
inet decided to rule Korea, and the following year, Japan declared war against
Russia, which also had a high stake in the Korean peninsula at the time. After
the winning this war in 1905 and signing the Treaty of Portsmouth, which was
arbitrated by Theodore Roosevelt, Japan officially secured its primary influence
over Korea.
3 Moving toward Annexation from 1905 to 1910
The turning point of Japanese comprehensive penetration was the Ulsa Treaty be-
tween Japan and Korea, signed November 18, 1905, which forced the Korean gov-
ernment to relinquish to Japan many of its rights and interests in the Korean penin-
sula. The prime minister of Japan, Hirobumi, threatened Emperor Gojong and
forced him to sign the treaty, which deprived Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty
and declared Korea a protectorate of Japan.
The annexation was expedited by the forced signing of the treaty. Two years
later, Ito Hirobumi, now the resident general in Korea, signed a full-fledged treaty
with the Prime Minister, Yi Wan-Yong. This treaty, later nullified as an illegiti-
mate international treaty, allowed the resident general to assume judicial and ad-
ministrative sovereignty. Gradually, what began as economic concessions to Japan
had expanded to cover even Korea’s most fundamental rights to sovereignty.
Accordingly, the formation of Korean resistance also accelerated. In general,
during this period, Japan suppressed the emerging anti-Japan sentiment for the
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sake of modernization (Duus 1998; McKenzie 1919). However, when Japanese
authorities abolished the Korean army in 1907, the dismissed Korean soldiers im-
mediately became a crucial part of the resistance movement. Most of these sol-
diers went back to their hometowns, where they began to organize local resistance
movements against Japan.
In this period, Japanese government expedited to enter into the Korean soci-
ety and the Korean people began to feel the colonization process to their bones.
Therefore, the resistance movements were inflated. According to Japanese statis-
tics, a total of 2,819 offenses targeting the Japanese army were made by Koreans
between 1907 and 1910. More than 17,600 people were estimated to have partic-
ipated in these attacks by 1910 (Eckert et al. 1990: 244).
4 The Era of Military Rule from 1910 to 1919
On August 22, 1910, Japan officially took over Korean sovereignty. A Japanese
governor general of Korea (the colonial headquarters) served as the chief Japanese
administrator in Korea until the end of World War II. Broadly speaking, in accor-
dance with Japanese imperialistic progress, the Japanese government shifted from
an era of military rule to an era of cultural rule, and then to an era of rule by as-
similation (Myers et al. 1984; Duus 1998; Kim and Mortimore 1975; Lone and
McCormack 1993).
In the early subjugation period, the royal family and most prominent political
elites became, at least on a surface level, submissive to the foreign rule. Thus,
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Japan let the Yi dynasty continue to hold its now nominal status. While the im-
perial family continued to live in its hollow palace, high-level positions in the
colonial government were quickly filled with Japanese-friendly Koreans. This
political transition was accompanied by significant social change. Japan launched
the nationwide land survey (1910-1918), which became the foundation for a newly
imposed tax system. Also, Japan quickly standardized many economic and social
structures. These “soft” changes covered various areas, including the financial
banking system, the educational system, the medical system, and a modernized
transportation system (Hwang 2010:159).
From 1910 to 1919, Japan implemented harsh military rule and dramatically
increased the presence of Japanese military police forces in Korea. After Japan
claimed full rights over Korean sovereignty, the colonial government repressed
and criminalized any sort of Korean dissent (Chen 1970). Military policemen
had the right to perform summary executions and exercised enormous repres-
sive control against any type of resentment from the locals (Sin 2001). In 1911,
the Japanese imperial government arrested eight hundred nationalist leaders (Sin
2001). By 1918, Japanese imperial authority had arrested, imprisoned, and exe-
cuted more than ninety thousand Koreans (Sin 2001).
To diminish associational life in Korea, Japan gradually banned all varieties of
local associations, beginning in 1905. Only two institutional systems existed on
a national level: schools and religious organizations, including Buddhist, Chon-
dokyo, Confucian and Christian organizations (Sin 2001). Secondary associa-
tions, if they were ever formed, were now short-lived (Baldwin 1979; Sin 2001).
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Yet, this aggressive repression failed to suffocate dissonance among the colo-
nized. Aggravated grievances of the colonized burst out anyway. Religious lead-
ers from all different traditions, radical students inside and outside of the Korean
peninsula, and political elites in exile all collaborated together to plan a nation-
wide protest against Japanese colonial rule. Regardless of the suppressive colo-
nial policies, ongoing collective efforts to restore Korean sovereignty continued to
grow. They reached an apex in 1919 with the advent of the March First Movement
(MFM), in which thousands of Koreans protested against and terrorized Japanese
imperial authority and its collaborators.
5 The Era of Cultural Rule from 1920 to 1931
After the MFM, the Japanese government realized forceful colonial policies were
inefficient and decided to transition from violent military control to more civi-
lized methods of control. Accordingly, a large number of military policemen were
converted into civilian policemen (Kim 2005). During this period, Japan slowly
started to perceive Korea as a complete subordinate part of Japan and allow partial
political participation of Koreans as well.
Furthermore, progress in technology and transportation had now made it be-
come impossible for Japan to completely control Korean associational life. In
the 1920s, the imperial government began to allow limited freedoms: for exam-
ple, Koreans were now allowed to establish a newspaper, businesses, and schools.
Approved associations were mostly cultural and educational and concerned with
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subjects such as youth and children, savings, academics, health, and anti-drinking
or -smoking efforts (Eckert et al. 1990). Although a limited numbers of politi-
cal and labor associations were allowed, their activities were strictly restricted to
nonpolitical projects.
The resistance movement, heeding this political transition, underwent signif-
icant change of its own. The movement had experienced unprecedented success
at nationwide mobilization but ultimately fail to restore Korean sovereignty. This
paradoxical situation led to a diversification of the various resistance groups. The
focus of political debates among the colonized had long shifted from whether
to how to oppose modernization without political emancipation, and different
branches of the resistance movement were now offering three broad answers to
this question.13
First, some of the MFM participants realized that the challenge of gaining in-
dependence for Korea was nested in the complexities of international politics. The
establishment of the provisional government of Korea (PGK) reflected this con-
cern with diplomatic needs. Second, other participants greatly disappointed with
the results of peaceful methods of resistance, realized that the movement needed
a better-equipped armed force. Their efforts led to the establishment of Korean
armies outside the Korean peninsula, to avoid Japanese control. A third set of
13 In some extreme cases, a few prominent participants, including Yun Chi-ho and Lee Kwang-soo,
turned away from the resistance movement in despair. For example, this is Yun Chi-ho’s journal
entry for April 11, 1919: “Their anti-Japanese passion is aroused. A policeman or gendarme
foolishly knows or shoots a man down. That is a signal for riot. Squads of soldiers go to a village.
They burn the houses and shoot down the inhabitants. This sort of tragedy is matched only by
the folly of the innocent and ignorant villagers as they head toward death and destruction.”
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participants noticed an urgent need for education of the broader mass population
of Korea. This line of thought was manifested in newly emerging cultural and
educational groups oriented toward cultural resistance.
6 The Era of Rule by Assimilation from 1931 to 1945
In the later colonial period, Japan practiced a more aggressive assimilationist pol-
icy that lasted until the end of World War II. The Manchurian incident in Septem-
ber 1931 had a particularly profound effect on Korea’s strategic military impor-
tance. Both the imperial project and economic exploitation in Korea were ac-
celerated since the Manchurian incident. Korea’s traditional agriculture-based
economy underwent extreme turmoil as conditions worsened especially in rural
provinces. Disputes between landlords and tenants increased dramatically, from
667 in 1931 to 7,544 in 1934 (Eckert et al. 1990: 308). Moreover, the manufac-
turing industry’s share of the manufacturing industry expanded from 17.7 percent
in 1931 to 40 percent by 1939 (Eckert et al. 1990: 310). The industrialization
that took place in the 1930s brought new types of class conflicts among Koreans.
Hence, nationalists were facing national loyalties that had been corroded by the
sudden breakdown of the traditional society.
Japan was becoming more and more involved in the war with China, and ac-
cordingly, Korea was increasingly strategically valuable to Japan. In consequence,
the Japanese government implemented rigorous assimilation policies in Korea of
the sort that are now referred to as cultural genocide along with its increased mili-
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tarization (Young 1997). In an attempt to eradicate Korean ethnicity, the Japanese
prohibited the use of the Korean language, the practice of traditional religion, and
all Korean historical education. During this period, the colonized Koreans were
allowed to change their names to Japanese ones and were encouraged to obtain
Japanese citizenship. In 1937, Japan also reinstated its prohibition of Korean
organizations. As scholars of colonial Korea have long recognized, nationalist
political life on the peninsula attenuated beginning in the late 1920s, and Korean
political and economic elites were intensively integrated into the colonial govern-
ment beginning in the 1930s. Since ordinary Koreans now had more opportunities
to become part of the Japanese citizenry, resistance efforts seem to have become
sporadic and partial. Yet, some nationalist efforts persisted, and the resistance
movement continued to evolve.
Over time, these harsh assimilation policies, along with growing cleavages be-
tween different classes of Koreans, made the resistance task extremely difficult.
Despite these challenges, the resistance movement continued, now focusing par-
ticularly on international activities outside the Korean peninsula. For example, in
1932, Yun Bong-Gil bombed the Shanghai International Settlement, killing Yoshi-
nori Shirakawa, a chief commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. Mem-
bers of the PGK built military schools in China and southern Russia and actively
engaged in international affairs, protesting Japan’s unjust rule over Korea. The
resistance movement endured until Korean independence was externally endowed
at the end of the Second World War.
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7 Summary
Korea was a unique case for Japan in its distinctive acquisition process. Whereas
other protectorates were the outcome of military conquests, Japan usurped the Ko-
rean peninsular as a result of an agreement. The signed treaty by two sovereigns
was the main source of legitimacy for Japan’s totalizing endeavor to control all
economic and political decisions, and this treaty was not fully accepted by the
majority of Koreans. Therefore, many Koreans strongly resisted imperial Japan
(Cummings 1984; Shin and Robinson 2001; Kim and Mortimore 1975), and this
resistance was much more intense than similar movements in other Japanese pro-
tectorates (e.g., see for Taiwanese resistance movements, Hechter, Matesan and
Hale 2009).14
Undoubtedly, living through these periods of history was challenging. During
this historical turmoil, many Koreans took part in different forms of collective
defiance, be it civic or violent, under the auspices of the army, the militia, terrorist
groups, or cultural and educational groups. The resistance movements were not
contained in the peninsula but were the products of collaboration among people
active in various locations – such as Japan, America, Russia, China and Korea–
through a diverse array of activities.15
14 Other Japanese annexed countries before the World War II are Taiwan, South Karafuko, Kwan-
tung Territory and South Pacific Mandate, Shandong. Japan also occupied Manchuria (part of
China) and Russian Far East.
15 While this thesis focuses on collective resistance, there was also significant resistance at the
individual level. Many Confucian intellectuals and politicians committed suicide as means of
resistance (Eckert et al. 1990: 242).
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As discussed above, civic resistance was a challenging task, particularly in
light of Koreans’ limited civic experience for the majority. The sudden transition
from monarchy to a colonial state deprived the general public of the opportunity
to become citizens, that is, active participants in the political process. Before colo-
nization, the majority of Koreans were mere subjects of the emperor, and political
participation was limited to a small group of elites. This lack of civic experience
was aggravated by the Japanese repression and criminalization of any sort of dis-
sent (Chen 1970). Colonized Koreans who opposed the Japanese regime were
subject to imprisonment, deportation, or execution. The severe repression of the
Japanese imperial government obstructed all forms of organization and associa-
tions among the local populace.
The mission of independence can all too easily make the Korean resistance
effort appear as a holy writ, but more significantly, it can also distract attention
from the mechanisms of resistance. I propose to focus attention on one mecha-
nism of resistance: relationships among the resisters. Instead of portraying the
resistance story as an idiosyncratic or continuous series of independent events,
I present the resistance movements in five different yet interweaving historical
periods, beginning with Japan’s initial penetration of Korea and ending with its
sudden withdrawal.
In addition, this study contributes to the existing narrative of Korean resistance
with rich relational depicts. The existing studies tend to focus intensively on spe-
cific resistance events rather than connect those events to their various contexts. I
argue that we must attend to the different ways that Korean resistance movements
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were exercised, negotiated, connected and configured over time. This disserta-
tion traces the movement’s shifting patterns of alliance and considers the different
ways that the colonized reacted against the imperial apparatus. I consider the na-
ture of the transition at both the top and the bottom, and at both the core and the
periphery of Korean society. In doing so, I outline a morphology of resistance
that I argue is crucial for understanding how the colonized united to oppose the
powerful imperial authority.
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APPENDIX A) Notes on Translated and Romanized
Names16







Social relations mediate collective action in various ways: collective action can
build on existing social ties, enhance or diminish particular connections, and im-
provise upon less explored links. Interpersonal networks are particularly critical in
authoritarian regimes that strictly prohibit organized resistance movements (Osa
2003; Mische 2008; Mische 2009; Opp and Gern 1993; Pfaff 1996; Petersen 2001;
Kitts 2000). Where organized dissent is strictly repressed, interpersonal networks
become a critical resource for mobilization. To avoid the repressive authority,
resistance movements mainly recruit through interpersonal relations, rather than
through more overt mobilization strategies, such as advertisements or organized
education efforts.
Given the clandestine nature of resistance movement and the conditions for
successful operation, which is the ability to hide their structure to avoid external
sanction, their relational structures are often hidden. The most salient challenge
of the research is gathering data for the overall structure of the Korean resistance
movements. Given the covert nature of oppositional collective action, how can
we empirically capture the structure resistance movements? To avoid external
sanction, clandestine resistance movements must be able to hide their structures of
operation, and that includes their relational structures. As a result, the most salient
challenge for this research project has been gathering data on the structure of the
Korean resistance movements. Given the covert nature of oppositional collective
action, I needed a way to empirically capture the structure of these resistance
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movements.
My approach builds on the social network perspective. The fundamental strength
of social network analysis is its ability to capture the links between social cate-
gories, which can be actors, organizations, or even epistemological concepts. In-
stead of looking at such categories separately, network analysis draws attention
to their connections. Accordingly, from a network perspective, social worlds are
understood not in terms of what their components are, but rather in terms of how
these components are connected.
This chapter articulates the network methods that are used to reconstruct the
hidden relational structure of the Korean resistance movement. Specifically, I use
a prosopographical approach (Bradley and Short 2005; Cohen 2002; Stone 1971;
Jones 2001) to depict a historically comprehensive picture of the Korean resis-
tance movement structures. I map the relational structures and structural changes
of the Korean resistance movements from the nascent stage to the closing mo-
ment. I begin by explaining prosopographical network analysis, which is this
thesis’s main method, I follow this explanation with an introduction to my data
source and research design. Finally, I show the graphical outcomes: the changes
in the movement’s morphological structures over time.
2 Prosopographical Network Analysis
Prosopography is a well-established method among historians, who use the study
of collected biographies to investigate “the common background characteristics
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of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives”
(Stone 1971). Most of those who use this method are attempting to understand
political action. The application of prosopography in the social sciences (for ear-
lier attempts see: Namier1929; Syme 1939; Merton 1938) nor the integration of
network analysis and prosopography (Duijvendak 2004; Duijvendak and Felling
1993; Padgett and Ansell 1993; Graham and Ruffini 2007) is not novel. How-
ever, most studies that combine these two methods have remained descriptive and
cross-sectional rather than analytical and historical.
The reason for this lag in methodological progress is the lack of high-quality
biographical datasets. Obviously, not every biography is suitable for rigorous his-
torical network analysis, since rich relational information is necessary to construct
a meaningful set of network data. For written individual life stories to be useful as
sources for network analysis, they need to include rich details about interpersonal
relations. In addition, a collective set of biographies is a prerequisite for yielding
global network structures at the macro level. This dissertation uses a collected set
of individual biographies to derive network data about who did what with whom
and when. In doing so, it advances the quality of this methodological marriage.
By incorporating prosopographical approaches (Bradley and Short 2005; Co-
hen 2002; Stone 1971; Jones 2001) with longitudinal network perspectives, I con-
struct historical network data. I have coded network information directly from
the biographies. The uniqueness of this data source allows me to address long-
neglected issues of historicity and temporality in the study of Korean resistance.
The biographies I use record the construction and deconstruction of ties and net-
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Figure 1: Prosopographical Network Demonstration at T1, T2, T3
works over time (Huisman and Snijders 2003; Moody, McFarland and Bender-
deMoll 2005; Snijders 2001).
To demonstrate a simple version of the modus operandi of prosopographical
network method, let me present an abstract example of the 1st zone coding. Sup-
pose that a seed population is composed by four actors, A, B, C and D and the
following are time stamped interactional information in each actor’s biography:
(1) A cooperated with B and C at T1; (2) B had a meeting with A, D and E at
T2; (3) C planned a terrorist attack at T3 with A and F; (4) D helped A and G at
T1. Then, based on this information from T1 to T3, six actors are identified and
their network evolution can be captured as shown in Figure 1. Nodes are actors
and their size in this map represents degree centrality of each actor. Based on the
interactional information from each individual’s biography, the evolution of such
a group is visualized. In the 2nd round of sampling, the biographies of E and F
will be coded and merged into the 1st zone result chronologically. In so doing, I
unveil the hidden structure of the resistance movement over a half-century.
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3 Data Source: A Collection of Biographies
Empirically, this project was made possible by the rich and detailed data that
many historians have worked to uncover. I obtained raw archival data from a
public data source, the Research Institute of Independence Hall of Korea.17 This
data source provided an archival collection of biographies of Korean nationalists
who participated in the Korean resistance movements.18 The database contains
10,153 biographies of nationalist activists from the early modern period.19 Not
every biography was suitable for rigorous historical network analysis, since rich
relational information is necessary for constructing a meaningful set of network
data.
Two unique features of the data set made this research project possible. First,
historians wrote the biographies of resistance fighters in a consistent manner, in
a chronological sequence, with full interactional data. In other words, each in-
17 One may raise a question about the ideological bias of the data source because it has been
collected and provided by an institution located in South Korea, particularly given the on-going
ideological antagonism between the North Korea and the South Korea. The database provides
biographies of participants regardless of their ideological affiliations, including anarchists and
communists (i.e., Lee Dong-Hui (ID 260) who was socialist and Kim Won-Bong (ID 472) who
later became one of the founding members of the North Korea). During the sampling process, the
one case that a name appeared in biographies does not have a biographical entry in the database
due to the individual’s ideological affiliation is Kim Il-sung who actively participated in the
Korean resistance movements. Kim Il-Sung is mentioned in Kim Joa-jin (ID 483 in my dataset),
an anarchist military leader. However, the nature of the relations described in the biography is
negative one, as Kim Il-sung arranged the assassination of the Kim Joa-jin, the relationship is
not coded as a cooperative relation and therefore Kim Il-Sung is not included in the search for
the next round of the sampling.
18 A sample individual biography is included in Appendix B at the end of this chapter.
19 Please note that the number of total biographies in the databese has been slightly increased since
the data collection point of 2010.
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dividual’s life story includes information on who did what with whom and when
(typically given in years or, less frequently, dates). The lengths of the biographies
vary across individuals, but the manner in which the stories are presented is con-
sistent, which allowed for the abstraction of common individual information. Sec-
ond, these subjects share a major political identity, which is resisting against the
foreign rule, during a relatively confined historical period. Therefore, the people
mentioned in one biography had their own biographies available in the database,
which meant that I was able to reconstruct the layers of their social world.
However, decoding these networks of resistance movements wouldn’t be pos-
sible without a qualitative understanding of the participants and their subjective
meaning that they give to the involvement. Throughout this study, I closely follow
the detailed stories of individuals in their biographies and draw on the qualitative
data from letters, journal entries, meeting logs, and poems, to decipher complexity
in relational patterns and structural configurations.
This biographical dataset shares the same general limitations of all historical
data. It was recorded retrospectively by historians, and we can only reconstruct the
past inasmuch as it is still available and tractable. There is always some possibility
of unrecorded or underreported problems. Strictly speaking, the social relations
these documents depict may not precisely represent the exact social relations at the
time of the event, meaning the results needed to be interpreted with some caution.
Despite these possible limitations, the richness of this historical data set—which
many historians worked to provide—deserves the rigorous empirical investigation
that this study offers.
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4 Data Coding
To empirically capture the resistance networks, I coded relational information di-
rectly from the biographies. Individual biographies contain time-stamped infor-
mation on the construction and deconstruction of cooperative network ties with
other participants.20 I used the biographies to gather the names of each activist’s
political partners. The political networks I constructed are thus based on names
given in the biographies.
I coded each activist’s biography for “cooperative relations” with other ac-
tivists. Cooperative actions included having secret meetings, planning terrorist
attacks, learning how to make bombs, and collecting money from supporters. Be-
cause of the nature of cooperation, this variable could not be asymmetric. Hence,
although the biographies may sometimes give the appearance of asymmetrical
relationships (in other words, not every mention of another activist was recipro-
cated), asymmetry is not considered in this thesis.
However, all ties recorded here are rather strong ones. I coded relationships
between activists who actually did something together and shared the risk of that
activity. In part, this approach to coding reflects my assumptions about the nature
of participants’ relations, but to a great extent, it also represents the way that
participants in the resistance movement actually were mobilized.
The identification process is conducted in three steps: 1) name in Korean and
20 A sample demonstration of the coding is included in Appendix C at the end of this chapter.
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Figure 2: Event Time Frames
Chinese, 2) date of birth and death, and 3) home town information.21 If all three
pieces of information match, the information is merged, unless there is any strong
evidence of identification (i.e., both names of a pair are mentioned in each other’s
biographies). Nodes are individual freedom fighters who partook in the Korean
resistance movement. I symmetrized all relationship given the nature of cooper-
ation. A tie from actor i to actor j (denoted either Xij or Xji) is 1 when the tie is
present and 0 if the tie is absent.
Events times (entering, exiting and all time stamped relations) are recorded in
21 Please note that typically Korean people had both Korean and Chinese names. This is mainly
because the official documents of the Joseon Dynasty were recoreded in Chinese until the Gobo
reformation in 1894.
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discrete-time units retrospectively. Tenures (ti denotes event time for individual
i) of individual participants were observed for varying lengths of time making
it necessary to standardize the counts of disruptive acts. At the individual level,
number of possible cases is four, as shown in Figure 2. For j4, start and end
time are outside observation period; for j2, start and end time are known; for j3,
end time is outside observation period (right-censored); for j1 start time outside
observation period (left-truncated). Thus, the population of participants in a given
year (Pt denotes the number of participants in time t) can be varying over time as
well.
5 One-way Snowball Sampling
In general, network studies collect data on entire populations, i.e. students in a
class or a school, or monks in a ministry. In this case, however, it is not effi-
cient to qualitatively cover all biographies in the database. Therefore I sample a
fraction of biographies to reconstruct the relational structure of the Korean resis-
tance movement. Since many participants were minor figures, their biographies
lack relational data. Therefore, random sampling would not have generated an
appropriate sample for this analysis.
I used a snowball sample, beginning with the 415 members of the Provisional
Government of Korea (PGK). I selected the seed group for two reasons: geo-
graphical location and historical timing. Many organizations located in the Ko-
rean peninsula didn’t have well-established organizational structures. The PGK,
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however, benefited from its location in China and had more formal structure com-
pared with other groups. In addition, the PGK was established right at the peak of
freedom fighting, so it provides a good locus of action to start with.
One possible concern is that this sampling design might risk the artifactual dis-
covery that members of the PGK are the key contributors to the resistance move-
ment. To assess this risk, I checked to see whether their presence was numerically
superior and if it was, whether their contribution was skewed, thereby distorting
the overall patterns of the resistance structure. PGK members made up less than
25 percent of the participants before 1919 (an average of 15%). After 1919, when
they became the dominant group (representing an average of 43% of participants),
their structural features are evenly distributed with little fluctuation. Thus, I dis-
missed the possibility of bias associated with overrepresentation.
Typically snowball sampling is an ego-centered data collection process. For
example, in an interview-based research design, researchers follow up with those
who are suggested to them by interviewees, comprising an ego-based snowballing.
Usually snowball sampling is used to get a sample that is hidden and hard to gain
access to. In other words, the directionality is often limited by data availability.
The adoption of a one-way snowball sampling method to this research requires
further discussion. In the current case, I can reach out in both directions, rather
than only following up with those people who appeared in an ego’s biography. I
can also search through the diaries of other people who may mention the ego in
their biographies. If I accept that two-way snowball sampling (ego and alter based
collection) is more appropriate to my project, this choice yields the following
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sampling procedure. Starting with the seed population of 415 PGK members,
the first sampling step yields 332 additional outgoing alters and 988 additional
incoming alters. The second round should also be two-directional: the outgoing
alters of 1,320 (the total of 332 outgoing ties and the 988 incoming ties) and the
incoming alters of 1,320 should be included in the second round. This procedure
is quickly ended with the largest component of all entries in the database, rather
than compressing the size.
This difference between one-way sampling and two-way sampling is partic-
ularly salient because ten well-known activists in the original seed population
(PGK) have over 200 incoming alters, with maximum of the 290 incoming ties.
The critical problem is not that the difference between an I-network and a Me-
network is large but that the discrepancy is highly skewed due to the nature of
the original data collection. The biographies were written in a retrospective way
and recorded by historians, which makes the biographies not entirely free from
reputation bias. Therefore, the more conservative route of one-way sampling is
appropriate. Furthermore, given that the critical function of sampling is to search
for smaller and relatively more representative fractions of the population, I choose
the conventional one-way snowball sampling method.
All of nominated actors in the 415 biographies constitute the first order zone
of the network. I sample all of the actors in the first zone and include the addi-
tional actors in the second-order zone, which includes all newly nominated actors
to whom actors of the first-order zone have ties. Five rounds of sampling yield the
final sample of 1,624 political activists. The expansion rate of snowball sampling,
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which is calculated by the proportion of additional actors in the newly gener-
ated sample, drops significantly after five rounds of snowball sampling. The first
round yields 332 additional actors with an expansion rate (ER) of 0.44. The sec-
ond round yields 392 new actors (ER=0.34). The third round adds another 246
new actors to the sample (ER=0.18). The penultimate round generates 173 actors
(ER=0.11) and the final round yields 66 new entries (ER=0.04).
I used the individual-level interaction data to construct a global network struc-
ture for each year from 1895 to 1945, yielding structural maps covering 51 years.
The sample of 1,624 resisters included 12 different movement groups identified by
their strategic differences22: Army (60), Cultural Movement (25), Enlightenment
Activists (29), March 1st Movement (243), Militia (259), Provisional Government
of Korea (415), Terrorists (96), Student Movement (16) and activists in Japan (1),
America (30), Russia (188) and Domestic Activists (262).23 Each individual par-
ticipated in the movement for an average of 11.03 years.24
The prosopographical network method unveils the hidden structures of the Ko-
22 Isolates are not included in the final analysis, as I am more interested in their structural com-
ponent. However, this omission does not mean that the isolates were dismissible due to their
quantity. Among the seed population of 415 individuals related to PGK, 79 were isolated from
the other people. That is, approximately 19% of participants activated within the resistance
movements lacked strong ties with other individuals in the movement cycle.
23 Group assignment in this thesis followed historians’ assignment of individuals to each group
based on their main association and commitment. These groups are interchangeable with iden-
tities in this sense.
24 This value is an actual average number of all participants. 81 cases lacking either entering
or exiting year information are omitted from this calculation. It is logical to assume that one
participates the movements at the earlier stage and then tend to have a longer tenure. However,
the correlation of the two is -0.3 which is not dramatically high. The tenure by entering year
table is included in Appendix D at the end of this chapter.
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rean resistance movements. It produces novel and meaningful loci to investigate
how participants in the resistance movements were connected with each other and
how these micro-level relationships generated macro-level structural patterns. In
the next section, I present visual outcomes to provide a sense of how the Korean
resistance movement’s structures changed over time.
6 The Morphology of Resistance
Using the prosopographical network method, I captured the morphology of Ko-
rean resistance movements over 51 years. The network trajectories show strong
connectivity among different resistance groups developed over time. Figure 3
presents the composition of different activists in Korean resistance movements
from 1895 to 1945 in five-year intervals.25 At the beginning, the most active group
consisted of conservative militias who were against Japan and all foreign powers
in general. Interestingly, the participants of the MFM were nested within the over-
all resistance movement much earlier than 1919 and remained in the movement
until the end of the colonial era. Also after the establishment of the PGK, this
organization had remained the most dominant group. From the changes in the
group composition we can see that gradually the movement strategy is diversified
and geographically spread.
25 Notes on abbreviations for Figure 3: ARMY for Army; CUL for Cultural Movement; ENL for
Enlightenment Activists; MFM for March 1st Movement; MIL for Militia; PGK for Provisional
Government of Korea; TER for Terrorists; STU for Student Movement Participants; USA for
participants in America; RUS for participants in Russia; DOM for Domestic Activists.
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Figure 3: Korean Resistance Groups
However, the changes in the group compositions should not be read in an
exclusive way. As shown in Figure 4, interpersonal relations among the KRM
participants are spinning through different groups.26 The External Internal Index
(EII) represents the relative connectivity in-group ties and out-group ties, varying
from -1 to 1. If members of a group have more connection within the group, the
EII gets higher and if members of a group have more ties with people outside of
the group, the EII gets close to -1. The EII is equal to 1 means that all members
of a group only have ties with the same group members and the EII is equal to
-1 means that all members of a group only have ties with people who are not be-
26 Please note that the range of Y axis is from -0.5 to 0.5 not -1 to 1.
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Figure 4: Normalized Average Intergroup Connectivity
longing to the group. To normalize the different group sizes, the overall EII is
calculated by the following: The average EII scores for each group are multiplied
by the group size of the year and then I divided the sum by the total number of
participants in a given year. Therefore, the overall EII shows the average ratio of
in-group and out-group ties of the Korean resistance networks. In the early pe-
riod, the Korean resistance networks exhibit more of intergroup connectivity than
intragroup connectivity. After 1908, the overall EII remains above zero, which
means they are more ties within a group. However, the over all EII still remain
below 0.5 and it drops significantly in 1919.
Closely looking at the inter-group connectivity by each group, as shown in
Figure 5, the conclusion is further confirmed.27 As the movements ripen and di-
27 Abbreviations for Figure 5 are identical with the ones for Figure 3: ARMY for Army; CUL for
Cultural Movement; ENL for Enlightenment Activists; MFM for March 1st Movement; MIL
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verge, they maintain a relatively high level of intra-group connectivity. This is
quite interesting, given it is often expected for social movements split over time
into different strategic groups and this separation negatively affect on the move-
ments (Koopman 1993). The Korean resistance movements didn’t split over time
and remained well inter-connected across different groups. Two possible explana-
tions can account for this convergence. The Korean resistance movements didn’t
have much resource to split over. In an extremely amputated situation, conflicts
between different movement groups may not enjoy the luxury of bifurcation. This
may well be true for other rebellious social movements. Also this could be driven
by the dominant resistance groups had particular characteristics. As shown in Fig-
ure 5, when the militia group was the dominant, members of the group tend to be
connected more to non-militias. Likewise, when the PGK was the most salient
group, members of the PGK tended to have more connections to the outsiders.
Therefore, On the basis of the evidence shown in these figures, it seems fair to
suggest that that the Korean resistance movements were composed with well in-
terconnected various groups.28
As presented in Figure 6, I identify five different morphological patterns of
Korean resistance movements.29 The first pattern is the archipelago shape shown
for Militia; PGK for Provisional Government of Korea; TER for Terrorists; STU for Student
Movement Participants; USA for participants in America; RUS for participants in Russia; DOM
for Domestic Activists.
28 The more detailed network representation of inter-group relations is included in Appendix E at
the end of this chapter.
29 Yearly Korean resistance networks from 1895 to 1945 are included in Appendix F at the end of
this chapter.
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Figure 5: External Internal Index by Group
for 1895 to 1899. During this nascent resistance formation stage, different groups
with some variations in their sizes emerged as distinctive and disconnected com-
ponents. The most dominant group in this period is the militia. Then, after 1900,
these groups wove together into a linear shape. At this time, the groups were
thinly connected and at significant risk of fragmentation. This linear structure
was sustained until 1905, when the protectorate treaty was signed. As Japan be-
gan to prepare for full-scale control over Korea, the resistance network structure
grew in a polycentric manner. By this time, the resistance movement’s capacity
had increased in terms of intergroup connectivity and overall density. A broader
context of opposition was taking shape. Each community in the largest component
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Figure 6: The Morphological Changes of Resistance Networks
expanded, and while they still maintained some distance from one another, they
also began to build stronger connections. Then, a relatively large core emerged
with fragmented subsets—the beginning of a globular shape. In this fragmented
globular shape, major communities started to connect with one another. After the
uprising in 1919, the overall structure of the resistance movements changed dra-
matically into a globular structure. A very dense core group emerged at the center
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with little fragmentation. This globular structure was maintained until the end of
the colonial era.
Revealing the hidden structure of the Korean resistance movement, the de-
scriptive visual results show the changes of the relational architectures of loosely
organized resistance movements. They show the relational importance of the
MFM within the overall structure, and they offer indirect evidence that interna-
tional politics (particularly America and Russia) is an important context for under-
standing Korean resistance. Most importantly, the MFM was laid on the surface
of the transition, sustained until the end of the colonial period. This morphol-
ogy shows that the MFM had a non-trivial impact on the resistance movement,
despite its failure to reestablish sovereign power, because it brought about a sig-
nificant structural change in the resistance network. The MFM successfully turned
a fluctuating network into a stable, organized structure. After this event, the resis-
tance movement established a cohesive network that finally connected its various
groups.
7 Conclusion
Events are nested in social time and space, and a long-term social movement is
made up of events nested within different historical periods and shifting social
boundaries (Sorokin and Merton 1937: 627). As such, social movements are or-
ganically constituted. Large social movements, in most cases, are not operated by
a single organization. Rather, social movements exist as a cosmos of heteroge-
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neous groups, which can be overlapping, complementary, or even oppositional. In
this sense, the concept social movement sector (which is developed by McCarty
and Zald 1977; Zald and Useem 1987) is especially important in loosely structured
collective action. To understand the cumulative effect of social movements, inter-
actions among different movement groups must not be neglected. Melucci (1985:
799) claims that social movements are best understood as “networks of groups and
individuals sharing a conflictual culture and a collective identity.” Therefore, it is
essential to understand relations, both formal and informal, among the different
groups and individuals that make up a social movement. As organic phenomena,
movement networks fluctuate over time, but do so in systematic ways.
I have used the prosopographical network method to uncover the hidden struc-
ture of the Korean resistance movement. Marrying the prosopographical method
with the social network perspective allowed me to discover important structural
features of the Korean resistance movement that were not identifiable with other
methods. This innovative methodology yielded a rich understanding of Korean
resistance structures. Participants in the Korean resistance movement were not
autonomous individuals struggling to free themselves from the constraints of colo-
nial control. They were heterogeneous crowds with different motivations for par-
ticipation. Through various strategic repertoires—petitions, media coverage, po-
litical protests, rallies, radical educations, cultural enlightenment, terrorist attacks,
and diplomatic appeals—the colonized forged a concrete space of political con-
tention. However, as I show in this chapter, individual members of these different
groups were strongly interconnected. By understanding interpersonal relations at
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the micro level, we can see the connections that underlie seemingly disconnected
events at the macro level.
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APPENDIX B) Sample Biography
i) A Summary of A Sample Biography
Name: Kim Gu (ID: 32)
Hometown: Haeju, South Hwanghae Province, Korea
Types of Movements: Provisional Government of Korea
Birth and Death: 1876. 7. 2-1949. 6. 26
Kim Gu was born on August 29 (Lunar Calendar July 11), 1876 in Kidong,
Baekunban in Haeju (South Hwanghae Province of Korea), as the only son of a
poor farmer Kim Soon Young and his wife Kwak Nack Won. His name at birth
was Kim Changahm. When he was nine years old, he started to study Chinese
classic texts such as Zazhi Tonggam, and Great Learning at local Seodangs (tra-
ditional education system in Joseon).
In 1893, he met Oh Eung-sun, a member of Donghak, He joined the Donghak
Peasant movement. Kim changed his name to Kim Chang-soo. As the organi-
zation grew rapidly, he was appointed the district leader of Palbong at the age of
17 and led hundreds of subordinates. Kim commanded a Donghak army regiment
in the 1894 Donghak Peasant Revolution. Following the instruction of Donghak
leader Choi Si-hyung, Kim Gu’s troops stormed the Haeju fort in Hwanghae, but
the army was eventually defeated by governmental forces. After that, defeated
by his companion, Kim Gu went to General An Tae-hun (the father of the An
Jung-geun who later killed Ito Hirobumi) of the royal army. An Tae-hun gave
Kim Gu’s Donghak rebels a safe pass (the prerogative of mercy), but other gov-
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ernment troops ignored An’s safe pass and attacked them. At this time, Kim met
Ko Neung-sun and was taught by him.
On October 8, 1895, Empress Myeongseong, the wife of Emperor Gojong of
the Korean Empire was assassinated by a group of Japanese assassins (the Eulmi
Incident). Miura Goro, then Japan’s Resident Minister in Korea, was suspected as
the mastermind of the assassination. In February 1896, Kim stayed at an inn in
Anakgun, Hwanghae Province while traveling to southern regions. There he found
a Japanese man named Tsuchida Josuke, who was disguised as a Korean and con-
cealing a Japanese sword, who was involved in the assassination of the queen. The
following morning, Kim attacked Tsuchida, took his sword, and killed him with
it. After the killing, Kim left a hand-written poster on a wall: “Kim Changsoo
from Haeju, Hwanghae Province, killed this Japanese man to revenge the murder
of Korean Queen”, as documented in his journal (Baekbeom Ilji). He waited at
his home at Haeju for three months before the police came and arrested him. By
this, Kim was tortured and sentenced to death. Many Korean people were sym-
pathetic and admired him for his patriotism and bravery, as shown by the facts
that his execution was suspended by order of Emperor Gwangmu, that Korean
judicial officials behaved politely to him despite Japanese pressure to execute him
promptly, and that influential Koreans at the time (including major merchants of
Incheon) made efforts to rescue him by repeated petitions to Korean Justice De-
partment Officials and by collecting money for his ransom before his scheduled
execution date. In prison, Kim changed his name from Kim Changsoo to Kim
Gu and adopted the pen name of Baekbeom. Kim stated in his biography that the
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change of his name symbolized breaking free from Japanese nationality records
and that he chose the pen name Baekbeom, which means "ordinary person", hop-
ing every ordinary Korean person would fight for the independence of Korea.
In 1898 he broke out of prison and escaped into Magoksa, a Buddhist temple
in Gongju, Chungcheong province, and entered the Buddhist priesthood. Kim left
the priesthood and returned to Hwanghae a year later, where he devoted himself
to the enlightenment and education of the Korean people, founding Changyeon
School and the Yangsan School in 1907, becoming the principal of the Yangsan
School. In 1904, he married Choi Jun-rye from Sincheon in Hwanghae Province.
In 1905, the Eulsa Treaty was made between Japan and Korea, making Korea
a protectorate of Japan. Kim participated in a mass protest against the treaty in
Seoul with Lee Jun and Lee Dong-nyeong and presented a memorial to Emperor
Gwangmu urging him to withdraw from the treaty. In 1908, Kim joined Shin
Min Hoi (New People’s Association), a national-level underground organization
established by Ahn Chang-ho for nonviolent Korean independence movement.
In 1910, when Korea lost her sovereignty, members of Shin Min Hoi were
gathered for a secret meeting at the house of Yang Ki-tak. Kim was there with Lee
Dong-nyeong, Ahn Chang-ho, Lee Si-young and An Tae-guk. In the same year,
the Japanese colonial government arrested An Myung-geun, a cousin of the An
Jung-geun who killed Ito Hirobumi, for plotting to assassinate Governor-General
Terauchi Masatake. Kim, who was a close friend of An, was suspected of be-
ing an accomplice and arrested as well. In 1911, Japanese government arrested
all members of Shin Min Hoi. Kim was jailed and severely tortured, but no ev-
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idence linking him to the assassination attempt was found and he was released
from prison after 3 years, 1915.
Kim exiled to Shanghai, China in 1919 after a nationwide non-violent resis-
tance movement, known as the March 1st Movement, which was violently sup-
pressed by the Japanese imperialist government. In Shanghai, Kim met with Lee
Dongnyeong and joined the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea
(PGK), which was established to liberate Korea from Japanese occupation. Af-
ter serving as the Police Minister, Kim became the president of the Provisional
Government of the Republic of Korea in 1927. He was re-elected to the office
many times by the Provisional Assembly. In 1928, with Lee Dong-nyeong and
Lee Si-young, he established the “Korean Independence Party.” In 1931 he orga-
nized a nationalist group, the Korean Patriotic Corps. One of the members, Yoon
Bong-gil, ambushed and eliminated the Japanese military leadership in Shang-
hai on April 29, 1932. The commander of the Japanese Army and Navy died
instantly. Another member, Lee Bong-chang tried to eliminate the Japanese em-
peror Hirohito in Tokyo on January 8 of the same year but failed. After escaping
to Chongqing where Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government was established,
in 1933, Kim established the Korean Liberation Army, commanded by General Ji
Cheong-cheon. November 1935, he called an emergency meeting of Provisional
Government of Korea. In this meeting, with Lee Dong-nyeong, Cho Kyung-han
and Cha Yi-seok, launched the Korean Nationalist Party. In 1939, Kim became
premier of the PGK.
When the Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941, Kim Gu declared war
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on Japan and Germany and committed the Korean Liberation Army to the Allied
side; the Korean Liberation Army took part in warfare in China and Southeast
Asia. Kim arranged for the Korean Liberation Army to advance to Korea in 1945
but days before the departure of the leading unit, the war ended. November 23rd,
1945, he came back to Korea with other members of PGK.
Soon after the independence of Korea, as the division of the newly indepen-
dent country became obvious, he led a team of former independence activists to
Pyongyang to hold a conference about unification with Kim Il-sung (who later be-
came the president of North Korea), but failed drastically after being humiliated
by Kim Il-Sung. In 1948, the inaugural National Assembly of South Korea nom-
inated Kim as a candidate for the office of the first president of the Republic. In
the election by the National Assembly, Kim was defeated by Syngman Rhee, the
first president of the provisional government, who had been impeached from the
PGK in 1925 by a vote of 180-16. He also lost the election for the vice presidency
to Lee Si-yeong by a vote of 133-59. Kim himself did not know about his nomi-
nation until after the election, and he did not approve the nomination, considering
it a ploy to discredit him. Also, Kim would never have participated in the election
as he fiercely opposed the establishment of separate governments in North and
South Korea. June 26 1949, Kim was assassinated by Ahn Doo-hee in his office.
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ii) Note on Translated and Romanized Names in the Biography30
30 All names are in order of appearance in the texts.
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APPENDIX C) Demonstration of the Coding
i) Sample Abridgment of (translated) Biography31
Gi, Wooman (ID 777, 1846. 8. 17-1916. 10. 28)
Hometown: Changsung, Cheonnam
Gi, a grandson of a vice minister Gi Jungjin, was born on October 17th 1846.
On October 8th, 1895, Empress Myeongseong, the wife of Emperor Gojong of
the Korean Empire was assassinated by a group of Japanese assassins (the Eulmi
Incident), Miura Goro, then Japan’s Resident Minister in Korea, was suspected as
the mastermind of the assassination. After this assassination, when the ordinance
prohibiting topknots was launched in order of Japanese government, Gi appealed
to the Empire of Korea against and wrote him official letter of denouncing Japan.
In January 1896, after receiving a manifesto from Yoo Inseok (ID 603), Gi made
an appeal in writing to mobilize militia to protect Korean dynasty from Japan. On
11th, February 1896, Gi went to Naju with Go Gwangsun (ID 1145), Gi Samyeon
(ID 1159), Gijuhyeon, Yang Sangtae, Gi Donggwan, Lee Seunghak (ID 1315), Gi
Dongno. In Naju, Gi mobilized more people to the militia and performed ancestral
rites at the local Kim’s shrine. While the group marched to Gwangju province, Gi
went into a mountain writing poems advocating traditionalism and patriotism. In
1904, Gi also moved to Gwangju. In January, Gi was appointed as official by the
provincial governor Lee Dojae, but he didn’t accept the offer because he didn’t
31 Names appeared with id numbers also have biographies in the data base, so their network infor-
mation is also included in the analysis.
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trust Lee.
In 1905, when the Eulsa Treaty was made between Japan and Korea, making
Korea a protectorate of Japan, Gi made an appeal to oppose Japanese control. In
1906, he tried to hold a large demonstration against Japan, but he couldn’t make it
and was arrested for a short period because of that. In January, 1907, Go Gwang-
sun (ID 1145) and Lee Hangseon (ID 1325) came to visit Gi and consulted with
other demonstration plans. As a result of this meeting, Gi was arrested again and
sent to a prison in Seoul. In 1909, after he got out of the jail, Gi wrote a book,
biographies on patriotic martyrs in Honam area: stories of those who actively par-
ticipated in the militia mobilization with Gi, including Gi Samyeon (ID 1159),
Go Gwangsun (ID 1145), Kim Bonggyu (ID 806), Kim Younggu (ID 1417), Park
Kyoungrae, Geon Sooyoung, Kim Youngyeop, Kim Ikjung (ID 1419), Kim Chi-
goen, and Park Yeounggun. In 1910, the Korean emperor Sunjong bestowed Gi
a noble title. But, in 1911, after Korea officially lost its sovereignty, Gi retired
to hermitage in the mountain and didn’t cooperate to any legal obligation. And
several years later, he passed away in the underground tunnel of the mountain.
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ii) Trajectory of Ego’s Structural Characteristics32
Gi (ID:777) from 1895 to 1911
32 Degree means the number of ties to other nodes (individuals) in a given network. Centrality is
measured by betweenness a node within a given network. Individuals who have many shortest
paths between other nodes in a given network have higher betweenness centrality than those that
do not.
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iii) Ego Network of Gi from 1895 to 1911
Gi (Ego #777) is the circled node in the ego networks. The sizes of nodes indi-
cate thier betweenness centrality in the global network. From the series of ego-
network, I can trace his strucutral voyage during his activated years in the Korean
resistance movements.
86
iv) Structural Position in the Whole Structure of Gi33
33 Locations of Gi (Ego #777) is indicated by the circle.
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APPENDIX D) Tenure by Entering Cohort
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APPENDIX E) Intergroup Relations
Each map represents intergroup connection with 5 years of interval from 1895 to
1945.34
34 Followings are the references of the abbreviations that represented in the color index: ARMY:
Army; CUL: Cultural activists; DOM: Domestic Resistance Movement Activists; ENL: Enlight-
enment Movement Activists; JAP: Activists in Japan; MFM: March 1st Movement Participants;
MIL: Militia; PGK: Members of Provisional Government of Korea; RUS: Activists in Russia;




APPENDIX F) Korean Resistance Networks from 1895
to 1945
Note: Followings are the specific representation of each group in these fig-
ures: Diamond: Domestic Resistance Movement; Double Triangles: Enlighten-
ment Movement; Up Triangle: March 1st Movement; Circle: Provisional Gov-
ernment of Korea in China; Box: Militia; Circle in Box: Army; Down Triangle:
Activists in Russia; Square: Terrorists; Round Square: Activists in the US; Plus:











A large-scale mobilization under the threat of severe repression is difficult (Jenk-
ins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978) and is particularly unlikely where civil society
is weak (Migdal 1988). However, in the spring of 1919, a series of great social
upheavals was observed in East Asia: the March 1st Movement in Korea, India’s
Jallianwala Bagh massacre on April 13th, and the May 4th movement in China.
The sudden surge of the MFM Korean resistance movement outbroke first along
with similar incidents in nearby countries and massive civil resistance movements
intensely observed in a rather short period of time. These historical events, as
with the Arab Spring, raise questions regarding unpredicted civil uprisings under
authoritarian regimes and urge rethinking of the existing theories of a weak state
and a strong civil society as favorable conditions for revolution (Dupont and Passy
2011; Migdal 1988).
From the beginning, the Korean resistance movement lacked a unified nation-
wide organizational center. Yet, despite both the fundamental obstacle for a large-
scale mobilization and severe oppression, colonial unrest crystallized into nation-
wide collective resistance with neither an independent civil society nor a well-
established resistance organization. How did the colonized under severe repres-
sion mobilize on a national scale? In what follows, I analyze the relationships be-
tween relational structures and mobilization, introducing two mobilization events
with different outcomes, which can address the full complexity of the historical
puzzle.
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Prevailing accounts for the Korean resistance movement focus mainly on mo-
tivational aspects, the political opportunity structure and popular dissent against
the Japanese imperial regime.35 One vein of this research focuses on the political
opportunity structure. Researchers emphasize the widespread revolutionary at-
mosphere of the era, as exemplified by Wilson’s doctrine in 1918 (Baldwin 1969;
Manela 2007) and the Russian revolution in 1917 (Ban 1998). Other studies em-
phasize the emotional conditions of Koreans galvanized by the death of Korean
Emperor Kojong (Wells 1989; Hatada 1969), which fostered resistance movement
in Korea.
However, the surge of collective action that opposed the powerful imperial
regime in a weak civil society cannot be fully explained by the prevailing theo-
ries of the international atmosphere of the era that helped the colonized garner
political opportunity and a deep animosity against colonial apparatus that built an
emotional foundation for mobilization. While political opportunity and motiva-
tion arguments are unquestionably helpful in explaining resistance mobilization,
given the weak civil foundation under the strong authoritarian regime, these ex-
planations are not sufficient for answering how large-scale escalations succeeded
despite weak civic foundations.
After a brief discussion of the historical background of the March 1st Move-
ment (MFM) and the June 10th Movement (JTM), I present the research design
and methods to contribute to the understanding of resistance mobilization and es-
35 Similarly, for the Arab case, economic hardships (Malik and Awadallah 2012), the vulnerabil-
ity of authoritarian regimes (Bellin 2012) and international politics (Dixon 2011) are seen as
conditions that motivated the recent resistance movements in Arab countries.
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calation in general. Then, building on the social movement network literature, I
introduce and statistically assess structural models to account for the mobiliza-
tion of the Korean resistance movements. Next, I revisit the MFM in comparison
to the JTM, elaborate my findings with historical detail and then proceed to my
conclusion.
2 Historical Comparison of the March 1st Move-
ment and the June 10th Movement
Korean resistance movements reached a climax in 1919 with the advent of the
March 1st movement (MFM), in which millions of Koreans protested against the
Japanese imperial authority and its collaborators. After the outbreak of the MFM
two days before the funeral of Kojong, approximately two million Koreans partic-
ipated in more than 1,500 demonstrations. Massive numbers of ordinary people
marched down thousands of streets on the peninsula, chanting “Long Live Ko-
rea!” Given that the estimated population of Korea at that time was 17,412,900,
approximately 11% of the population participated in the MFM. In addition to the
remarkable number of participants and the intense reaction of Japan, the diversity
of participants should be noted. This unprecedented peaceful civil demonstration
resulted in the deaths and imprisonment of thousands of unarmed civilians.36
36 According to Japanese records, within the month of March 12,000 people were arrested and 553
killed. However, Pak (1920), a Korean historian, has argued that 46,303 people were arrested
and 7,509 were killed.
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Eckert and his colleagues argues that participants in the MFM came from all
existing classes according to the gendarmerie’s official reports on interrogations of
Korean prisoners (1996:45). Reviewing the court records of the arrested Koreans,
Sin (2001) further evidences the heterogeneous participation of the MFM. The
arrested Koreans were from various religious back ground and the majority was
atheist (43%). People with no education and unable to read and write comprised
22% of the records. Given this remarkable diversity in the participants, how was
this wide and heterogeneous mobilization possible?
As noted earlier, the central themes of the existing literature on the MFM have
focused on emotional factors and the political opportunity structure. First, schol-
ars who cite emotional factors point out the hardships encountered under Japanese
imperialism and the rumor of a poisoned emperor. Wells argues that the MFM was
“an opportunity seized at short notice and transformed into a nationwide by a for-
tuitous: the death of Korea’s ex-Emperor Kojong, and the rumor that he had been
poisoned” (1989:7). The second dominant explanation emphasizes the interna-
tional politics of the time, specifically the influence of the declaration of Wilson
in 1918 (Manela 2007; Baldwin 1969) and the Russian Revolution in 1917 (Ban
1998). Manela (2007) argues that the MFM occurred under the influence of Wil-
son’s declaration of self-determination. This line of argument emphasizes that the
revolutionary atmosphere of the era urged Koreans to realize their opportunity to
rise up.
The comparison of this case to the June 10th movement (JTM), however, chal-




























Table 1: The comparison of MFM and JTM
bilization and shared a remarkable historical resemblance to the MFM, as sum-
marized in Table 1. Similar to the MFM explanations, historians argue that the
international political atmosphere and emotionally charged domestic affairs led to
the second insurgency. At the advent of the JTM, China had been undergoing an
intense cultural revolution since 1925. Communism influenced local resistance
movements not only in China but also in Indonesia, Manchuria and other nascent
countries. Furthermore, in the summer of 1926, after the death of the last Korean
emperor Sunjong, rumors circulated that Japan involved in his death. The spread
of the similar rumor about poisoning of the emperor provoked patriotic sentiment
among the Koreans.37
37 I am not claiming, by any stretch of the imagination, that the events would have carried exactly
same emotional weights on Korean people. However, the similarity in their setting cannot be
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The JTM began at the funeral of the emperor Sunjong, however it failed to
spread to the national level and was quickly suppressed. According to historical
records, there were approximately 20,000 participants in the JTM nationwide and
approximately 1,000 people were arrested. Although it was successful to some
extend, however, compared to the mobilization outcome of the MFM, the result
was disappointing to many participants. While the two movements shared many
of the same motivational factors, their mobilization outcomes were drastically
different.
This comparison of the two events highlights one critical limitation in our cur-
rent understanding of the Korean resistance movements. This analogy suggests
that the international situation and emotional catalysts are not sufficient to drive
successful resistance movements. As observed earlier, I argue that the missing,
but important, factor is the overall structural contexts of mobilization. In the next
section, I discuss recent developments in social movement network theory and its
contribution to the understanding of resistance movements to establish a theoret-
ical background for the empirical analysis of the structural context of the Korean
resistance movement.
3 Network Visibility and Covert Mobilization
Relational understanding of political insurgency, protests and mobilizations yields
insights into why and how some people are mobilized for a specific collective ac-
dismissed.
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tion while others are not (McAdam 1982; Marwell et al. 1988; Marwell and
Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Sandell
1999; Snow et al 1980). Particularly in non-democratic setting, relational com-
ponents play more critical role. For example, analyzing the relationship between
resistance movement networks and levels of protest and repression in Poland, Osa
(2001; 2003) finds that in an authoritarian context, network development among
participating organizations is a critical and enabling apparatus in the affordance
of political opportunity. Zuo and Benford (1995) also find similar effects of pre-
existing network structures facilitating large-scale social movements in repressive
regimes.
While the importance of interpersonal relationships for a risky mobilization
has been widely recognized (Opp and Gern 1993; Osa 2001; Osa 2003; Love-
man 1998; della Porta 1995), understanding how the structure of covert resistance
matters its mobilization process is in need for sophistication. Most scholarship
converges on the critical role of social relations in generating momentum for col-
lective action and large-scale mobilization, but there is less agreement on how
high-risk social movement networks operate under repressive regimes. Building
on two distinctive structural features of covert collective action noted in existing
literature, I elaborate the current observations to a testable theory based on the
percolating role of visibility of covert networks.
First, densely connected covert networks tend to be more isolated than inte-
grated. Loveman (1998) finds that dense interpersonal networks tend to insulate
activists, which lead to higher levels of commitment by participants. In general,
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dense networks are considered to be more effective for recruiting new members
(Marwell et al. 1988; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978;
Fireman and Gamson 1979; Sandell 1999). However, as with other underground
networks, resistance movements in repressive contexts must hide their structure
to avoid strong sanctions from various repressive apparatus. Hence, densely con-
nected movement networks have a higher cost of visibility and are less successful
in resistance mobilization. Therefore, as opposed to the positive association with
a mobilization in overt or democratic contexts, the visibility of a resistance move-
ment network is expected to have a negative effect for its successful mobilization.
Bear in mind that in considering visibility, I am concerned with external dis-
cernibility, that is independent of the willingness of the participants, as distinct
from public exposure. Publicity is more or less voluntary self-disclosure of the
participants. However, participants in high-risk collective action usually can’t af-
ford the luxury of openly announcing their plans.38 From the outsider’s perspec-
tive, certain network structures are easier to detect compared tthan others. For
example, when a given network is embedded in a society, a densely connected
cluster can be easily identifiable over a thin line structure, or spanning tree. The
38 Passy (2003) brings in the intervening effect of network structures and the larger society in
which they are embedded. Cross-referencing two social dimensions of movement characteris-
tics, legality and visibility, the author offers four distinct types of social movement organiza-
tions. Laying out four distinctive conditions for mobilization, she analyzes how functions of
social networks vary according to their public visibility, measured by media exposure. In orga-
nizations with less public visibility, interpersonal ties of members are more critical in recruiting
prospective members. When the organizations are perceived as illegal, they have limited means
to gain visibility. However, as the author’s concept of visibility refers to voluntary exposure
which is limited by the availability, it is not equivalent to the visibility definition of Morrill and
his colleagues (1998).
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different function of visibility in covert mobilization can explain the inverse di-
rectionality of the dense network effect for covert mobilization.
Second, covert social movements often exhibit a high level of heterogene-
ity. This heterogeneity has a positive effect for collective action. In general,
the homogeneity of a group is positively associated with collective action and
it is widely known that homogeneity lowers the cost of joining the group (Opp
2009). Nonetheless, investigating the relationship between high-risk social move-
ments in authoritarian regimes, Loveman (1998) finds that the heterogeneous per-
sonal networks, which exited between non-Catholics and Catholic leaders and
also amongst different professionals, such as lawyers and politicians, are the most
important factors to enabling the success of human rights movements in repres-
sive settings. Furthermore, Bayat (2005) shows that the Islamic Revolution in Iran
in 1979 was led by very diverse groups of people from different ethnicities, class
orients and occupational associations. Participating subjects hold their own inter-
pretations of the goal due to the lack of communication resources. Additionally,
in the case of members of the left wing clandestine groups in Italy during the 70s,
della Porta also shows that often radical terrorist groups are nested inside of a
wider social movement sector (della Porta 1986 and 1986).
In a situation where available resources are extremely limited for attaining a
given end, one selects political collaborators, which has the greatest probability
of attaining the goal and yet one may sacrify strategic or ideological homophily.
For example, authority is widely perceived to be illegitimate, often supporters of
peaceful protest can consider the violent reaction to that as legitimate when they
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appear to be effective (White 1989). White shows that supporters of peaceful
tactics are not hostile to violent strategies, as long as the two camps agree upon
the target’s illegitimacy.
Underlying these process are two assumptions. The need to lower the visibility
of the network structure results in a loosely connected and fragmented structure,
which can lead to limited mobilization capacity. Hence, engaged participants re-
lax their barriers for overall homogeneity, which yields a highly heterogeneous
composition of rebellious mobilization. Therefore, theoretically, a fragmented
and heterogeneous network structure, which can afford the distinctive needs and
wants of the participants, is expected to be pertinent for successful covert mobi-
lization.
In this regard, to develop a theory of structural visibility of a covert move-
ment network, temporal and physical focuses need to be shifted. Despite what
we know about how people come to join to a resistance movement, a clear gap
in the literature remains regarding exactly how participants are connected to each
other and how these relational structures are related to the mobilization outcomes.
In particular, the kinds of network structures that are more efficient to permeate
and to mobilize larger number of people is unknown. In order to solve this prob-
lem, I empirically test the structural visibility effects of resistance networks for
mobilization.
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4 Analytical Model: Variables and Measurements
In this section, building on the social movement network literature, I introduce
key structural variables to account for the mobilization of the Korean resistance
movements. The dependent variable is the number of new participants in each
year directly measuring the success of mobilization. To test for structural effects
in the degree of mobilization, a robust regression model is adopted because the de-
pendent variable has significant outliers (Choi 2009; Huber 1964; Western 1995).
A total of 50 cases are included in the final analysis.
As discussed earlier, in social movement research, density and centrality have
been the most common structural variables. However, density measure’s sensi-
tivity to network size becomes a serious problem in this study, because the size
of Korean resistance networks varies over time. To compare structural features
of different sizes of networks, I use two alternative measures, modularity and het-
erogeneity, to capture overall fragmentation and heterogeneity of networks, which
are independent of the network size.
To measure the degree of fragmentation, I use modularity (Newman 2006;
Shwed and Bearman 2010). As shown in the Figure 7, a high modularity score
indicates the higher fragmentation in the network and a low modularity score in-
dicates that subsets of the network are less fragmented and more visible.39 Re-
placing density with a size independent measurement, I compare the degree of
connectedness of different sizes of networks. If resistance networks are closely
39 These graphs are duplicated from the example of Shwed and Bearman (2010).
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Figure 7: Modularity of Artificial Networks of Ten Nodes
knitted, they are exposed to a higher risk of being detected. Such network struc-
tures also lack capability to reach out to the larger population for covert mobi-
lization. Hence, I argue that in a resistance movement network, modularity has a
positive effect for mobilization.
As an alternative measure to replace the centrality score, I use the k-core score
(Seidman 1983). A higher k-core score means that an actor occupies a more
central position in the subgroups. To normalize the k-core score, I calculate the
heterogeneity of the overall network (Bearman 1991; Finke and Stark 1988).40
40 Heterogeneity =1- [(a/z)^2+(b/z)^2+(c/z)^2. . . .], where denominators represent the number of
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Figure 8: Heterogeneity of Artificial Networks of Six Nodes
Heterogeneity captures structural diversity directly. In Figure 8, the two illustra-
tive graphs have same density but have different k-core compositions: The left
hand side graph in Figure 8 has four 3-core nodes and two 1-core nodes and the
right hand side graph has six 2-core nodes. The former has a dense core with
some peripheral hangers, while the latter has a uniform network but lacks a highly
connected core: the left hand side graph is more structurally heterogeneous than
the other one. Structural heterogeneity is expected to lead to higher reachability
and thus to have a positive effect for mobilization in resistance movements.
Additionally, two control variables are included, military rule (from 1910
to 1919) and assimilation rule (from 1931 to1945), both of which are periodic
dummy variables. These two variables are necessary to control for the exogenous
periodic effect on mobilization because the Japanese imperial authority changed
their policies over the course of its 35 years of official colonial control, as noted
people in each k-core zone and z represents the number of participant in a given year. These
graphs are duplicated from the example of Seidman (1983).
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earlier. Under authoritarian regimes, oppositional network formation is sensitive
to the political apparatus (Osa 2001). Likewise, the Korean resistance movement
was not immune from interference of Japanese colonial policies that inhibited
collective opposition. To control for and measure the level of regime coercion, I
added two dummy period variables.
Military rule is expected to negatively contribute to resistance levels, as the
risk of being a participant is positively associated with severe repression. Many
Koreans suffered the greatest hardship during military rule, which resulted in the
lower level of resistance. Similar to the mobilization of other social movements,
severe repression negatively affects the recruitment of new participants.
Similarly, assimilation is expected to have a negative association with resis-
tance level. Dong (1973) argued that intense assimilation had a positive effect on
the integration of the colonized Koreans in favor of the Japanese system, showing
an inverse ratio between the level of assimilation and the number of political of-
fenses by Koreans. However, while these two policies have opposite connotations,
like the stick and carrot, they are still the two sides of the same coin, which were
used to lower the level of resistance of the Koreans. This transition at the sur-
face level from force to finesse still served the same end, to suppress insurgency
among the colonized. Hence, both control variables are expected to have negative
association with the mobilization success.
Including these two periods of military rule and cultural rule allows for stronger
arguments on the structural effect of the resistance movements, which are resilient
against external coercion. These control variables are indirect but critical indica-
111
tors of validity of the visibility argument. If the harsh threat is positively associ-
ated with mobilization, then it rejects the visibility argument because the argument
assumes the threat is negatively related to the likelihood of participation.41
5 Results and Findings
Table 2 presents the variables used in both the descriptive and statistical analyses.
Density and centrality for descriptive statistics are calculated in conventional and
straightforward ways. Given the size of networks, Korean resistance movement
networks display relatively loose and sparse but with significant variances (from
0.007 at the low end to 0.073 at their climax) over time. Likewise, the range of
centrality changes from 0.0034 to 0.0375 reflecting the hierarchical structures of
resistance networks. As discussed earlier, military rule and assimilation rule are
dummy variables.
Figure 9a shows the descriptive changes in the demographic characteristics
over time including the size of the movements each year and the number of peo-
ple entering and exiting each year. Figure 9b shows the descriptive changes in the
structural variables: density and centrality, and Figure 9c shows the correlations
of network t1 and t2 based on network similarities. Interestingly, the trend of cor-
relation of the networks changed significantly beginning in 1919. The fluctuating
network correlation stabilized after 1919. The dynamics of the collective resis-
41 In discussion of the level of political violence and state repression, the two are known to have
the inverted U-shape (White 1989). However, I here focus on both violent and civil resistance,
this assumption is not directly relevant to the discussion.
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Military Rule 1 if military rule is
applicable
0.2 0.404 0 or 1
Assimilation
Rule
1 if assimilation rule
is applicable









Table 2: List of Variables and Operationalization
tance movements changed dramatically after 1920, as presented in Figures 10a
and 10b. The resistance movements became smaller after the MFM, but density
and centrality increased.
Table 3 presents the results of the multiple robust regression analysis on mobi-
lization. I examine the general structural effects for mobilization. I find significant
positive effects of modularity and heterogeneity. Networks with higher modularity
and heterogeneity are more successful in mobilization. Closely-knit networks are
less efficient for attracting new members. These findings indicate that fragmented
and heterogeneous networks are more successful in terms of mobilization, and
this argument holds true even after controlling for period effects. I find negative
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Figure 9: Descriptive Reports of the Variables
effects of both military rule and assimilation rule. Although an assimilationist
policy variable is not statistically significant, the directionality supports my initial
expectation. Hence, the negative effects of threat reinforce the visibility argument.
Based on this general result, in the next section, I revisit the MFM and provide
a structural account of its successful mobilization, weaving back to the historical






Military Rule -11.138 (2.4113)***
Assimilation Rule -2.945 (2.438)
_cons -140.629 (18.513)***
N=50
NOTE: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<0.001
Table 3: Robust Regression Model on Mobilization
6 Structural Comparison of the March 1st Move-
ment and the June 10th Movement
In this section, weaving back to the specific historical discussion provided ear-
lier, I apply the general findings to the March 1st movement and the June 10th
movement and further demonstrate the expansion process. Figure 10 presents the
resistance movement networks for each year. Although their international fuse on
resistance motivation and patriotically charged emotional condition were similar
to each other, the resistance network of 1919 was far much more efficient for mo-
bilization than that of 1926. The sudden explosion of the MFM only was possible
because of its structural strength as a flat and sparse network. The pictorial rep-
resentation of the networks shows that the network structure for 1919 was sparser
than that for 1926.
However, group level variables may not capture the full fledged picture of ex-
pansion. Modularity and heterogeneity, as well as density and centrality, measure
overall structural features of the existing network. Given the fact that relation-
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Figure 10: Resistance Network Structures
ships are not evenly distributed in the network, theoretical counter arguments can
be posed: fragmented networks are efficient for mobilization through their densely
connected core. In the same manner, heterogeneous network structures may have
a positive effect for resistance mobilization through highly centralized actors.
Thus, to precisely test how the network expands I explore specific location
where people enter into the networks. Improving the precision of structural ac-
counts of mobilization, I introduce two new structural variables of newly recruited
freedom fighters: Entry to the Core and Entry Heterogeneity. To trace morpholog-
ical expansion in the given year and precisely understand the incoming cohort’s
structural aspects, I estimate the manner in which new participants plug into the
existing network structure. Entry to Core measures the k-core score (Seidman
1983) of the incoming cohort to capture exactly where newly recruited partici-
pants are connected into the existing network structure, i.e., whether they enter
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into the core or the periphery. Thus, this variable can capture whether the newly
recruited participants entered into the core or the periphery. In the same manner,
I capture the heterogeneity of new participants.
Comparisons of the two events are summarized in Table 4. The MFM resis-
tance movement networks of 1919 were more loosely knitted, as indicated by the
density scores (0.007 for 1919 and 0.013 for 1926). In 1926, there were more
centralized actors than in 1919 (0.0034 for 1919 and 0.0047 for 1926). Mod-
ularity and heterogeneity also show that the network structure of 1919 is more
fragmented and heterogeneous compared to the one of 1926. As I demonstrated
in the previous section, in covert collective action, visibility plays a negative role
in mobilization and thus the fragmentation of resistance networks has a positive
function for mobilization.
Two additional structural features enhance my theory of visibility, elaborating
the recruitment process. In 1919, the average entering cohort’s core score is 3.44
and higher than 2.0 of the year of 1926. In 1919, the distribution of the k-core
score ranged from 1 to 10, and the median was 5.5. Given the distribution of the
k-core score for the incoming cohort, more people were peripherally connected.
In contrast, in 1926, the distribution of the k-core score ranged from 1 to 3 and
the median was equal to the mean. Relative entry to core score is 0.625 for 1919
which means new participants are more likely to join to the periphery of the re-
sistance network. The average entry to the core in the year of 1926 is 1, which
means new participants enter the movement around the median in the structural
hierarchy. Therefore, the network structure in 1919 exhibited more active work-
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1919 1926
Number of Ties 2,765 (= 1,871) 1,657 (=-2)
Average Centrality 0.0034 0.0047
Density of Network 0.007 0.013
Modularity 0.746 0.525
Heterogeneity 0.81 0.61
Size of Incoming Cohort 539 12
Entry to the Core 0.625 1
Entry Heterogeneity 0.838 0.625
NOTE: indicates the difference in values for t and t-1.
Table 4: Structural Contexts of the March 1st and the June 10th
ing peripheries than that in 1926. Furthermore, new participants in 1919 display
more heterogeneous connection to the existing hierarchical positions compared to
1926. Hence, I argue the remarkably successful mobilization in 1919 was derived
by its structural strength for covert mobilization.
By examining the structural properties across different resistance groups over
the entire resistance period. I show that the significant legacy of the MFM was
imprinted on the relational structure of the resistance movement. This finding an-
swers a question of specific interest to Korean historians: What was the legacy of
the MFM? Here we see that, while the MFM failed to restore Korean sovereignty,
the event overlaid the significant structural change on the resistance movement.
Without an understanding of the structural legacy that accumulated from the be-
ginning of the Korean resistance movements, the insurrection of the MFM may
be misinterpreted as “a monolith with no ranges leading up to it or away from
it” (Wells 1985:7). However, the evident existence of the MFM participants in
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the resistance movement networks disproves the argument of the MFM as an iso-
lated historical event that did not significantly impact later resistance movements
in Korea.
7 Conclusion
How do less powerful people successfully mobilize to resist a powerful and re-
pressive regime? For many cases we have almost no idea, but for this case we
happen to have data that allow us to observe precise unfolding dynamics over a
long period time. In this chapter, I build a novel way to study these hidden dynam-
ics. Examining the networks of Korean resistance movements between 1895 and
1945 and comparing the March 1st uprising in 1919 and the June 10th movement
in 1926, I argue that without understanding the overall relational structure of re-
sistance movement, the oppositional insurrection cannot be properly understood.
While accepting that pervasive motivational accounts provide plausible conditions
of the Korean resistance movement, I find that neither opportunity structures nor
emotional conditions are sufficient to mobilize large-scale social movements. To
understand the successful resistance mobilization with little civil foundations, I
argue that the structural features of participants are the most critical factors to
predict the successful mobilization. Elucidating the mechanisms that moved the
historical machinery, my approach emphasizes interpersonal networks of resis-
tance participants, which serve as critical channels for resistance mobilization in
repressive regimes.
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My findings demonstrate the general importance of structure in three ways.
First, loosely connected fragmented network structures are more efficient in re-
cruiting more people to the resistance movement. In other words, unlike low-risk
social movements in a democratic regime, the visibility of networks has a neg-
ative effect on mobilization and network fragmentation has a positive effect on
recruitment. Second, structural heterogeneity has a positive effect on covert mobi-
lization. Allowing varying reachability, heterogeneous network structure is more
effective to attract new participants. Lastly, the structural allocation of newly re-
cruited members is also important in successful mobilization. Given the nature of
the resistance movement, the risk of being a participant is significantly higher than
in other types of social activism and the reactions from the authoritarian regime
are quite different from those in democratic societies. In a weak civil society,
the role of these interpersonal networks in oppositional movements is even more
critical as they substitute for absent civic associations that usually stimulate civil
mobilization. Hence, the power of less powerful people arises from their connec-
tivity with the other ordinary people. By building social ties, people generate a
robust relational structure that nurtures their collective action.
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CHAPTER V




In this chapter, I shift my focus to demobilization. Much of the work in social
movement literature to date has been interested in mobilization and joining. Rela-
tively little has been scrutinized regarding demobilization and withdrawal. More-
over, as I discuss further below, existing data are very limited. Hence, I aim to
fill that lacuna in the literature. To comprehend the full dynamics of the Korea re-
sistance movements, I investigate the relationship between individual action and
global-level movement outcomes: specifically, the relationship between individ-
uals’ participation in and withdrawal from resistance groups and the growth and
the decline of those movements. This chapter offers a historically grounded ex-
planation for large-scale social change. It illuminates the critical role of social
relations in resistance movements and investigates how relational changes affect
the evolution and devolution processes of social movements.
Using the data presented in Chapter 3, I develop structural accounts of the
formation and dissolution of the Korean the resistance movement. I answer the
following questions: What structural mechanisms can explain the evolution and
devolution of the resistance movement? How do different structural mechanisms
affect mobilization and demobilization processes differently? A close examina-
tion of the dynamics of Korean resistance movement structures provides useful
information for the understanding of other resistant movements and answers a
fundamental question regarding the nature of collective action. I use historical
network data, which provides a novel means of studying the full sequence of re-
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sistance movements by highlighting their relational aspects. I fill an important
lacuna in the literature by linking the macro-level evolution and devolution of
social networks with micro-level processes of forming and dissolving social re-
lationships. By incorporating the demobilization process into social movement
literature, I aim to enhance our understanding of the social structural effects of
collective action.
In the following section, I discuss my theoretical context: expanding the scope
and the existing literatures on social movements and social networks. Using the
same empirical case: Japan’s occupation of Korea and the reaction of Koreans
to the colonization process. Then, I present data sources and methods, followed
by data analysis and results. In the final section, I discuss the implications of the
findings.
2 Extending the Scope
To understand the relationship between social relations and resistance movements,
I draw on both social network theory and social movement theory. I contribute
to the literature on social movements by exploring the demobilization process,
which remains understudied in the field.42 This section discusses the importance
of extending the scope of studies of social movements to include the entire period
of action from their early formation to their dissolution.
42 Following McCarthy and Zald’s (1977), I use a broader definition of social movement as "a
set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences," in contrast to social
movement organizations, which have higher degree of formality.
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Scholars have argued that social relations are critical for understanding how
people are mobilized into collective action. Social relations offer insight into why
and how some people are mobilized for a specific collective action while others
are not. Particularly when collective action is risky or legally prohibited, social
relations are critical in attracting people to a movement (Osa 2003). From both
a structural and instrumental perspectives, then, social networks are particularly
important for understanding social mobilization. Social networks provide an “ini-
tial disposition” to participate (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Social networks also
furnish opportunity structures and shape decisions that enable socialization for
individuals within a larger group (Passy 2001). In addition, the information and
resources that are distributed through such networks constitute the basis for be-
coming a collective (Mische 2009; Osa 2003).
From a network perspective, macro structure is derived from interactions and
relations at the micro level. Many scholars have used relational perspectives
to capture “relational components,” of collective action in general (Gould 1993;
Hardin 1982; Marwell et al. 1988; Marwell and Oliver 1993) and social move-
ments in particular (Baldassarri and Diani 2007; Diani 1996; Diani 1997; Diani
and McAdam 2003; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 1991; Gould 1996;
Hillmann 2008; Knoke 1990a; Knoke 2003; Passy 2001; Livesay 2003; Mars-
den 1999; Morris and Langman 2002; Snow et al. 1980; Bearman, and Everett
1993). Studies focusing on recruitment and mobilization processes have garnered
rich contextual details relating to the effects of social networks on mobilization.
Scholars have considered various aspects of collective processes and have inves-
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tigated how social networks evolve and congregate, not only within one network
but also across a group of networks. As a result, a rich understanding of the im-
portance of social networks in movement mobilization has been accumulated.
However, one important aspect of social relations has received surprisingly
little attention in studies of social movement networks: the destruction of rela-
tionships (Sandell 1999). Human relationships are neither permanent nor free
from termination; in most cases, human agents can decisively terminate any type
of social relationship. Sandell has argued that one-sided research on collective
action is not sufficient to explain this aspect of collective action. Similarly, social
movement research has given more attention to mobilization that to movements’
devolution processes (Koopmans 1993). To understand the dynamics of collec-
tive processes, research should encompass both the emergence and dissolution of
social networks to both explain mobilization and describe what occurs after mo-
bilization (Koopmans 1993; Zald and Ash 1966). A missing piece of the puzzle
is a longitudinal account that covers social movements from the beginning to end.
Expanding the scope of social movement research in this way enables a bal-
anced understanding of both the emergence and dissolution of social relations.
Rather than examining particular stages (emergence, coalescence, institutional-
ization and decline), of the Korean resistance movement, I focus on its entire
trajectory from beginning to end.43 Reflecting on the latest developments in the
general field of sociology, network researchers have become more rigorously en-
43 For detailed discussions of movement stages, see the works of Blumer (1969); Mauss (1975);
Tilly (1978); Porta & Diani (2006); Miller (1983).
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gaged with temporality and have questioned not only how elements are connected
to one another but also how their connectivity changes over time. This chapter is
designed to echo this new direction in the field.
3 Explaining Social Movement Growth and Decline
How can we explain the growth and decline of social movements? Social move-
ment network analysis suggests that two important structural variables may ex-
plain the mobilization process: network density and centrality. Density represents
the degree of denseness and connectivity in a network, and centrality captures the
hierarchical aspect of networks. In networks with higher centrality, distributions
of relations are not identical across individuals and groups. Scholars have sug-
gested that density is a significantly positive factor for mobilization (Marwell et
al. 1988; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Fireman and
Gamson 1979; Sandell 1999). Furthermore, some scholars suggest that move-
ments with greater centrality are more efficient at mobilization (Diani 1997; Osa
2003). In this part of the analysis, I examine how these two structural variables
changed over time in the Korean resistance movement. I also examine how the re-
lational properties of this movement at different moments had significant effects
on its growth and decline.
My analysis examines cross-sectional pictures of this movement’s network
and also traces longitudinal changes over time. As a result, I am able to present
this collective action network in a more complete way than if I used either ap-
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proach alone. I show how the movement’s social structures evolved and devolved
over time. The primary goal of my analysis is to fill the gap related to structural
components in Korean historiography. An additional goal is to present causal ar-
guments pertaining to social movements. To accomplish these goals, I examined
a continuous time line rather than one point in time, I investigated social rela-
tions rather than fixed organizational boundaries, and I provide structural accounts
rather than individualistic accounts. In the next section, I present the historical
background of the empirical case, followed by data sources and methods that offer
a novel way to investigate the full course of social movements. This examination
of networks of resistant movement participants reveals the structural properties of
both evolution and devolution in the colonial Korean resistance movement.
4 Analytical Design
By examining temporal data on individuals who joined and left the resistance
movement, this thesis successfully addresses the neglect of the devolution pro-
cess. The dependent variables in this paper are mobilization and demobilization,
and each variable is measured by the number of people joining and leaving resis-
tance movements, respectively. The interpretation of the results should be read
with some caution. It’s reasonable to assume that different resistance groups had
different thresholds for entry and exit. But since I’m interested in mobilization
and demobilization for the overall resistance movement, I have not been con-
cerned with these sorts of group variations, and my conclusions should be read in
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this light.
I measured this chapter’s independent variables in a conventional and rela-
tively straightforward manner and also lagged by a year. Size is the total number
of activated resistant freedom fighters, and the entering and exiting variables rep-
resent the number of people who recently joined the movement and the number
who were no longer active. Density and centrality were measured based on con-
ventional calculation methods for network analysis.
Density (D) is measured by group level density of the network. Density of a
graph is the proportion of observed relations to theoretically possible relations; a
denser network means that more people in the graph are connected to each other.
The density score is also normalized by population size. Group level density D is
the measured by the following equation, where L is the number of present relations
in the graph and n is the number of nodes (individuals) in a given network. As the
graph is undirected, the possible number of ties is divided by two.
Centrality (C) is measured by betweenness centrality to capture the hierar-
chical structure of networks at the macro level (Freeman 1977). However, ego-
centered network centrality does not directly correspond to group level central-
ity (Marsden 2002). Therefore, in this paper, I will use the average of top ten
percentile actor’s betweenness centrality scores on each network. Each actor’s
centrality is measured by the following, where CB(ni) is centrality of individual i
(Wasserman 1994). Let gjk be the number of geodesics connecting j to k and let
gjk(ni) be the number of geodesics linking the two actors, j and k, that pass through
i.
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To understand structural effects on the growth and decline of resistance move-
ments, I adopted a Poisson model. Although the time span of the data is 49 years,
the analysis includes a total of 48 years because the dependent variable lags by one
year to test structural effects on the following year’s mobilization and demobiliza-
tion (Xt-1 -> Yt). The sudden uprising of the March First Movement, a nationwide
nonviolent resistance movement, happened in 1919. As a result, 1919 and 1920
were extreme cases, so I eliminated these two years from the final analysis.
The period of time following the MFM shows participant entry and exit pat-
terns that appear to differ markedly from those before the event. Therefore, I
conducted two sets of analysis for each outcome variable: recruitment and with-
drawal. In the first set, I included all years that were available. In the second set,
I divided the samples into pre-1919 and post-1919 groups to determine whether
there was any difference in social relations after mobilization stabilized. The next
section explains the descriptive outcomes and reports the statistical findings. In
this analysis, which assesses differences in relational structures across time, I used
comparison methods to identify the resistance structures that emerged from social
relations in different times. In other words, my analysis pursues relational cata-
lysts of structural change.
129
Figure 11: Korean Resistance Networks from 1896 to 1945
5 Evolution and Devolution Process of Resistance
Movement
This section describes the evolution and devolution phases of the Korean resis-
tance movement. I present basic outcomes in two formats: networks and descrip-
tive statistics. Basic outcomes are presented in a format of networks.44 Figure 11
shows structural maps of political activists from 1896 to 1945 to provide a sense
of structural changes over time. I used individual-level interaction data (n=1,624)
to draw a global network structure for each year from 1895 to 1945, a total of 51
years.
The Korean resistance movement grew in size until 1919, when it stabilized
44 This is simplified version of resistance movement networks. Detailed maps are available in
Chapter 3.
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Figure 12: Population Changes of the Korean Resistant Movements
structurally. It decreased in size after 1920. The dynamics of the resistance move-
ment changed dramatically after 1920. Figure 12 shows the trajectory of the re-
sistant movements. The Korean resistance movements grew in size until 1919 and
subsequently stabilized structurally and then declined in size after 1920. Accord-
ingly, after failing to restore of the national independence, the size of the defiant
movements shrank. The dynamics of collective resistance movements changed
dramatically after 1920. Based on the descriptive findings, I found evidence for
two different stages, at least, of the Korean resistance movements: Evolution and
devolution. Hence, I incorporate this finding to my analysis that I present next.
6 Explaining Social Movement Growth and Decline
Table 5 shows the statistical results of the analyses of recruitment. I first examined
the general effects of density, size of participants, and centrality on recruitment
(see Model I in Table 5). I found that density and size had a statistically signif-
icant negative effect on recruitment. Dense activist networks and large networks
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I. Overall II. Evolution III. Devolution
Coef (Std Err) Coef (Std Err) Coef (Std Err)
Density -.0032*** (.0007) -.0070*** (.0010) -.0072 (.0198)
Size -.0024*** (.0004) -.0050*** (.0010) .0046 (.0030)
Centrality -.0012 (.0008) -.0037*** (.0010) .0256 (.0383)
Constatnt 4.3285*** (.2509) 6.1054*** (.4590) .6046 (3.9722)
NOTE: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<0.001
Table 5: Poisson Regression Models on Mobilization
were less efficient at attracting new members. I found an insignificant negative
effect of centrality on recruitment. However, when I examined the differential
stage effects of these variables on recruitment, the results indicated different ex-
planations. Most strikingly, although all three variables were significantly nega-
tive in the developing stage, they all became insignificant in the later stage, when
the movement stabilized (see Model II, Pre-1919 in Table 5). Size and central-
ity effects became positive but were not statistically supported. Therefore, these
analyses provide clear evidence of the existence of differential mobilization stage
effects. In the early, developing period, less dense, smaller, and less centralized
activist networks were more successful in attracting new members.
Table 6 displays the statistical results of the analyses of withdrawal. The neg-
ative effect of density on withdrawal was not statistically significant, but the posi-
tive effect of size and the negative effect of centrality were statistically significant.
People were more likely to exit larger and less centralized activist networks. As
in the analysis of recruitment, I observed a dramatic change in the explanatory
patterns for mobilization and demobilization before and after 1919. In the devel-
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IV. Overall V. Evolution VI. Devolution
Coef (Std Err) Coef (Std Err) Coef (Std Err)
Density -.0013 (.0011) -.0078*** (.0019) .0077 (.0123)
Size .0041*** (.0003) -.0029 (.0018) .0093*** (.0018)
Centrality -.0049* (.0024) -.0416*** (.0038) .1036*** (.0234)
Constatnt 1.6072*** (.2858) 5.1846*** (.8399) -3.7102 (2.4406)
NOTE: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<0.001
Table 6: Poisson Regression Models on Demobilization
oping stage, density had a statistically significant negative effect on retreatment,
and network centrality also had a statistically significant negative effect on the
retreatment of network constituents (see Model V, Pre-1919 in Table 6). In other
words, less dense and less centralized networks lost more people in the early stage.
However, after 1919, when the resistance movement became relatively stabilized,
size and network centrality became positive and statistically significant. The den-
sity effect in the later period was positive but statistically insignificant. Therefore,
more centralized and larger networks lost more people in the later stage.
A comparison between recruitment and withdrawal reveals interesting results,
as presented in Figure 13. As the movement became established and matured,
the effects of density, population size and centrality changed. Interestingly, in the
developing stage, density and centrality had statistically significant negative ef-
fects on both recruitment and withdrawal (Models II and V). The effect of size
on recruitment was statistically significant and negative. The size effect on with-
drawal in the developing stage was negative but not statistically significant. In
this sense, patterns of network effects on recruitment and withdrawal in the earlier
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Figure 13: Significant Results in Comparison
stage are consistent. However, in the later stage, I did not observe a significant
network effect on recruitment, although size and centrality appeared to have posi-
tive effects on withdrawal. Although the results should be interpreted with caution
because the stage model analyses use smaller samples, this study provides inter-
esting evidence of pattern similarity between recruitment and withdrawal as well
as different periodic effects.
7 Conclusion
To date, social movement research has devoted extensive attention to the success-
ful mobilization of movements. The demobilization process, however, remains
understudied. Social movements, whether they are covert or overt, depend on two
basic individual actions: joining the movement and leaving it. Sandell (1999) ar-
gues that joining and departing are equally important aspects of collective action.
Accordingly, this chapter devoted attention to both mobilization and demobiliza-
tion. It drew on archival research to construct a new empirical and historical net-
work data set to facilitate two theoretical tasks: revealing processes of structural
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change in resistance movements and explaining the evolution and devolution of
resistance movements.
The use of historical and prosopographical network construction methods makes
it uniquely possible to capture both recruitment and retreatment patterns over time
(i.e. when individuals join and/or leave movements). The adoption of a network
perspective on the mobilization process has allowed for significant contributions
to our understanding of the process of recruitment and joining. Examining func-
tions of density, centrality, and size has been especially informative. The signif-
icant empirical findings are the following: Density, centrality, and size had sig-
nificant effects on both entry and exit in distinctive ways. Generally, density and
size had negative effects on recruitment. Larger and less centralized movement
networks had higher levels of withdrawal. However, at the early stage, density,
size, and centrality had negative effects on recruitment, and high density and high
centrality led to lower levels of withdrawal. At the later stage of the movement,
when mobilization stabilized compared with the earlier stage, size and centrality
variables were significant and positive only in explaining the degree of demobi-
lization (but not in explaining recruitment). This evidence indicates that mobi-
lization should be investigated in a manner that is sensitive to the timing of its
developmental stages. In the developing period, less dense and less centralized
network structures were associated with more flexible turnover patterns. How-
ever, in later stages, larger and more centralized network structures tended to have
more flexible turnover patterns.
This analysis has established a new foundation for future research on the mo-
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bilization and demobilization processes of social movements. Demobilization
shouldn’t be inversely understood based on what we know about mobilization.
Demobilization is not failing mobilization. It has its own dynamics and mech-
anisms. As this chapter has shown, comparative studies that investigate social
movement joining and retention at the individual level help us understand the full
dynamics of mobilization and demobilization at the macro level. These theoreti-
cal findings also contribute to the recently growing interest in dark networks, in-
cluding illegal networks and terrorist networks (Milward and Raab 2006; Memon
2008; Everton 2011). To properly understand relational structures that operate




RISK ON THE MARGIN
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1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai as a
structure of clandestine networks; I investigate how the provisional government
distributed risk at the group level and the individual level. My goal is to show how
local risk distribution shaped the macrostructures in which individuals were em-
bedded and hence affected both organizational vulnerability and individual risk.
The structure of covert networks is critical for the persistence of clandestine asso-
ciations, so it is surprising that social scientists have only a limited understanding
of the resilience of such networks. The lack of analytically rigorous investiga-
tion in risk is particularly disturbing, since risk is the fundamental and definitive
characteristic of a covert organization. This chapter explicitly addresses the clan-
destine nature of a resistance movement organization and empirically takes more
rigorous ways to examine the relationship between risk and that organization’s
covert network structures. 45
Any secret organization established to support a disapproved political cam-
paign, economic transaction, criminal deviant, cultural enactment, or biological
interaction faces an ontological conundrum. Whether the purpose is to avoid sanc-
45 In this analysis, risk, or “anticipated danger,” is interchangeable with cost and danger. For de-
tailed discussion of the two concepts, please see Wiltfang and McAdam (1991). This distinction
is critical to understand participants’ subjective understanding of the experience. However, this
is not the focus of this study, and I am not using the term “risk” to measure subjective under-
standing of the cost. Here, I use the term in a much more mundane, objective, and calculable
way. This study’s definition of risk is different from the definition used in discussions of “the
risk society,” which use the concept to refer to immeasurable and incalculable risks, in contrast
to danger (Beck 1992).
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tions or to garner distinction, the organization must resolve the tension between
secrecy and collectiveness. In other words, it has to juggle the organizational per-
sistence it needs to pursue its goal with the structural secrecy it needs to minimize
exposure.46 Sociologists have long been interested in this puzzle. Studies of se-
cret organizations, which can be traced back to Simmel (1906), have focused on
the organizational structure that is needed to reduce the risk associated with expo-
sure. This balance between being secrecy and organization is a constant challenge
to a secret organization while it exists. Analyzing how risks are distributed after
mobilization tells us much about the functioning and survival strategies of secret
societies. Simmel argues that the need for secrecy leads to a hierarchical organi-
zation that maximizes organizational efficiency.47 This line of thought suggests
that the need for secrecy confines the organizational structure to a particular type
(Aubert 1982:290), since the clandestine nature of membership precludes most
normal mechanisms of recruitment.
The recent resurgence of interest in associational secrecy is a result of the cur-
rent interest in criminal organizations, particularly terrorist networks. The rise of
46 The subject of secrecy may invite various questions that are beyond the scope of this disserta-
tion, so I want to clarify my focus to avoid possible misunderstanding. When a secret activity is
ephemeral and isolated, the balance between secrecy and collectiveness is not an issue. Exam-
ples can be found in the search for an abortionist during the 1960s (Lee 1969) and in historical
leper colonies (Sato and Frantz 2005). In the abortion case, most females used neglected social
ties to get the work done and then moved on with their lives separately afterward. As Erickson
(1981) noted, the main difference between one-time outreach and secret organization is per-
sistence. Similarly, leprosy patients in quarantine don’t look for new members and cut off all
relationships with the outside world to pursue total isolation. Only when the need for the secret
activity is repetitive and connected to the larger society does this ontological dilemma become
critical, and that is the case of this chapter.
47 See Erickson (1981) for a sophisticated classification of different types of secret organizations.
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terrorism draws attention to clandestine alliance (Gibbs 1989; Oberschall 2004;
Turk 2004). Accordingly, a large number of studies have sought to understand
terrorist networks (Sageman 2004; Tsvetovat and Carley 2005; Moody 2005; Lin-
delauf et al. 2009; Krebs 2002; Raab and Milward 2003; Mishal et al. 2005). The
recent growth in publications on secret networks is undoubtedly associated with
urgent problems in the contemporary world, but the issue of a hidden association
echoes the longstanding intellectual puzzle introduced above.
Most studies of covert organizations and their social network structures, espe-
cially in political science, economics, criminology and sociology, are descriptive
snapshots rather than rigorous analyses. These studies share an assumption that
external threat influences the structure of covert organizations, but do not explain
exactly how the structure is related to the external threat. To answer the question
of how covert organizations secure their resilience, I investigate risk distribution
among members of a covert organization. This chapter has two purposes: first, to
document existing models’ failure to explain the mechanisms that covert organi-
zations use to persist, and second, to explain differential distribution of risk helps
solve the puzzle of how covert organizations balance structure and secrecy.
This chapter statistically analyzes the networks of the Provisional Government
of Korea, an underground political organization that fought against Japanese colo-
nialism from 1919 to 1945. I create direct measures of group and individual risk
that I use to test the resilience of this covert network. Below, I present the theoreti-
cal background for this analysis, focusing on covert social networks. I then briefly
introduce my case and descriptive network changes over time. Next, I analyze the
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relationships between the network’s structural characteristics and the vulnerability
of the organization and the participating individuals. I conclude with a discussion
of my findings.
2 Covert Network Structures and the Risk Distribu-
tion
Covert networks constantly operate against potentially destructive external threats
to their structures and therefore have a strong urge to secure their structures that
are robust enough against the constant threat. Unlike discussions on overt social
networks, we have a distinct motivation to deconstruct covert network structures.
Particularly from a counter-terrorism perspective, recent scholarship has made
serious efforts to address the question of how to destabilize terrorist networks
(Carley 2006; Farley 2003; Gutfraind 2010; Xu and Chen 2008; Koschade 2006)
and more directly address the risk factor of covert networks.
Three basic structures of covert networks, shown in Figure 14, can be derived
from the literature on terrorist organizations. Each of these graphs represents the
network foundation of a covert constellation.
The first is the chain model depicted on the left. The chain shape is a group of
individual actors connected by a thin structure. Lesser et al. (1999) argue that the
chain structure is appropriate especially for stealthy economic transaction. While
the chain model has been used to describe the structure of terrorist networks, it
doesn’t adequately represent more complex, effective organizations. For example,
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Figure 14: Models for Covert Networks
when a key actor is removed from this type of organization, the organization can
easily become fragmented.
The second model is the pyramid type shown in the middle. This model is
also structurally fragile, in that the deletion of an individual or a tie can break a
large constellation into disconnected subgroups. Removing members at the upper
levels of the group can have a domino effect on the whole organization. However,
since comparative few people occupy the top echelon, they are less likely to be
removed. The main advantage of this model is its efficient performance. Naquin
(1976) suggests that China’s millenarian rebels were structured consistently with
this model.
The key difference between the chain model and the pyramid model lies in
the latter’s use of hierarchy. A linear structure may decrease organizational ef-
fectiveness. The organization tends to be less hierarchical, and therefore the risk
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associated with the omission of a node is uniformly distributed. In a pyramid
structure, on the other hand, the upper part of the hierarchy is critical and needs
to be protected. In overt social networks, centralized hubs are considered to be
powerful because they have more control over the network. By contrast, in covert
social networks, hubs are vulnerable because most information goes through them
and so they are more likely to be exposed. Hence, a centralized covert network
may be effective in coordination, but can be vulnerable to targeted attacks (Sage-
man 2004).
The third constellation describes a complete model. In this model, all the
group’s members are well connected with one another, so the structure enhances
the organization’s performance and durability. A network consistent with this
model is shown in the graph on the right. This model can yield efficient task per-
formance because everyone shares information and resources, and risk is evenly
distributed among the nodes. Densely connected networks are suggested likely to
have low resilience (Zawodny 1978). In terms of hierarchy, this type of network
is decentralized. Every node on the network share ties with all others. Since this
network is densely connected, the removal of one node is not catastrophic. The
disadvantage of this model is a holistic risk of exposure—every node functions as
a hub. In both the chain model and the complete model, risk tends to be evenly
distributed throughout the network. Structurally, these two networks are quite
similar, though their arrangement is different: the former is more spread out than
the latter. Both structures are associated with low density.
Using the most frequently used Krebs’ data on the 9/11 hijackers as an ex-
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ample, Farley (2003) highlights the ordered nature of terrorist networks. Farley
emphasizes that while in comparison with law enforcement agencies criminal net-
works are often assumed to have non-hierarchical structures, terrorist networks
appear to be more ordered, strikingly similar to military organizations. Given
the ordered nature of covert network, removing which terrorist yield drastically
different impact on fragmentation of the networks.
In his calculation of cut set and the caused disturbance by capturing k members
in a total of n terrorists in the network, he assumes that the leader L has same
probability (1/n) of being captured as a foot solder (1/n) at the bottom strata of the
terrorist structures. However, this assumption seems unrealistic, as acknowledged
even by the author, as neither the likelihood of being exposed to law enforcement
nor the probability of being captured by external authorities is equally distributed
across different structural positions in terrorist networks.
Using networks of suicide bombers, Pedahzur and Perliger (2006) argue that
the existence of cohesive subgroups as well of the number of hubs (who were
connected to most of the actors) both have an influence on the network’s effec-
tiveness (defined as the ability to carry out suicide attacks). The authors also
show that actual suicide attackers are at peripheral positions in the network and
possess a relatively low number of ties.
Furthermore, Demiroz and Kapucu (2012) also argue that density of terrorist
networks is not evenly distributed. Using the case of the Ergenekon Terrorist Or-
ganization in Turkey, the authors evidence that by removing the densely connected
core, the terrorist network is split into two sentencing camps, one made of petty
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criminal charges and another composed of heavy and lengthy sentences. Unfor-
tunately, the question of why removing core nodes yields segregated networks, or
thinly connected distinctive subgroups, is not fully theorized in their paper.
All of the aforementioned studies share the main burden of data availability
articulated at the beginning of this section. Although interesting empirical snap-
shots have been accumulated, the literature still lacks clear answers as to how and
why such unique and fluctuating features can be observed in covert networks. This
chapter begins by empirically testing which model best describes the Provisional
Government of Korea. I then examine the relationships between this network’s
structural features and its level of risk. First, though, I introduce my case and
research design.
3 Research Design and Data
Although scholars have increasingly become aware of the importance of under-
standing the structure of covert networks, the empirical research on hidden net-
works has not been rigorous enough. As Sparrow (1991) rightly points out in
his discussion of criminal networks, this is due to difficulties that are inherent to
studying hidden organizations. First of all, a covert network dataset is inevitably
incomplete, due to limited information. Also, the boundaries of clandestine orga-
nizations are often fuzzy and informal. In addition, the dynamic aspect of covert
organizations can be a critical challenge: members circulate through the organiza-
tion quickly, and therefore the memberships are volatile and unstable. Hence, the
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study of covert networks is in urgent need of better data sets and an appropriate
approach that addresses these difficulties.
To mitigate these challenges, I designed this study to focus exclusively on a
formal clandestine organization. I compensated for a possible lack of information
by exploiting a historical data source. Finally, I investigated the organization at
multiple time points, from its establishment to its extinction. I focus on the Pro-
visional Government of Korea (PGK).48 The PGK was the exiled government of
Korea; it operated underground in Shanghai from 1919 to the end of World War II.
I selected this case not because it represents all clandestine organization, but be-
cause it is a good example of a highly resilient covert organization. The PGK was
a formal organization with a relatively clear boundary. Members’ biographies pro-
vide rich historical information, and this is a rare benefit that contemporary cases
do not offer. Rather than looking at few time points or collapsing all the informa-
tion insensitive to time, I reconstruct a network time series of PGK members from
1919 to 1945.
This chapter draws on 415 biographies of PGK activists from 1919 to 1945.
I used the prosopographical network method (Bradley and Short 2005; Cohen
2002; Stone 1971; Jones 2001) introduced in Chapter 3 to construct a series of
relational data. In addition to the members’ relational information, I also used data
48 The selection of one focus group can be justified in terms of controlling for organizational-level
errors. Different organizations exhibited various patterns of devolution. Also, different groups
are exposed to different level of risk. Terrorists faced more thorough oppression and more severe
punishment than participants in cultural movements faced. Therefore, vulnerability to external
sanctions would not be the same for all groups. Hence, rather than collapsing different groups to-
gether, I focused exclusively on one organization and the internal relationship structures among
its members.
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on arrests and executions, which are available for members of the PGK from 1919
to 1945.49 The average individual tenure within the resistance movement was 16
years, which implies that members were seriously committed to the organization.
Participants in my sample represent fairly well each of the provinces in the Korean
peninsula. Hometown information is unavailable for some members, but of the
rest, 196 were from the northern part of Korea and 201 were from the southern
part.
In addressing the risk faced by a covert organization, I focused on two de-
pendent variables: the vulnerability of the organization at the group level and the
likelihood of a member’s being subjected to external sanctions.50 To statistically
test the relationship between structural characteristics and organizational vulner-
ability, I used a linear regression model in which the dependent variable was the
number of members who left the group due to external sanction. To test individual
vulnerability, I used a Logit regression model in which the dependent variable was
a dummy variable indicating whether a member had been executed.
My decision to use the probability of being executed or detained as a measure
of risk may require explanation. The risk of running a covert organization, espe-
49 I merged the data on arrests and executions for two reasons. Theoretically, in this chapter, I’m
interested in vulnerability to external sanctions imposed upon participants, not the degree of the
sanction. Empirically, many of those who were arrested lost their lives in prison sooner or later
after the apprehension due to the extreme torture imposed in an effort to gain further information
from them. Because of these historical conditions, there is little empirical difference between
arrest and execution.
50 Casualty is central issue in resistance movements and terrorist attacks. Having a close friend or
relative arrested, detained, or killed probably influences one’s likelihood of joining a resistance
movement. For example, Moody (2005) rightly argues that the causality has a much larger
impact on the victimized community in that it boosts animosity and emotional intensity.
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cially an illegal one, is very complex and extends beyond a total number of appre-
hensions. Not all people at risk are eventually arrested or executed, and arrest and
execution are not the only risks that participants face. Mobilization and organi-
zational activity operate with greater difficulties and under greater surveillance in
covert organizations than in overt organizations. Hence, arrests and executions are
limited measures of the risks that a covert organization faces. However, analysis
of this data remains valuable, so long as the results are interpreted with caution.
Furthermore, data on any prohibited activity share the same kinds of limitations,
as well as possible problems of underestimation. The assumption of this study is
that there is a relatively fair match between the risk level and the number of casu-
alties. Measuring risk is a significant and ongoing research problem, and I believe
this operationalization is a good surrogate for a nonexistent direct measure of risk.
4 The Provisional Government of Korea Networks
Before moving on analytical test on the data, let’s take a close look at the PGK
networks. In this section, I compare the PGK network in the year of 1919, which
is shown in Figure 15, to a randomly generated graph (on the right hand side) in
order to capture structural characteristics of the observed PGK network (on the left
hand side). The generated graph has the same size and the degree distribution.51
Preserving the degree distribution of the 1919 PGK networks with 140 nodes and
314 ties, the random graph is generated. By fixing the degree distribution, the
51 Degree distribution is shown in Appendix G at the end of this chapter.
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Figure 15: 1919 PGK Network and A Random Graph
comparison can amplify the structural components of the network: not simply how
many people have relationships with others but how uniquely the relationships are
constructed.
The comparison highlights several interesting structural features of the ob-
served network. The diameter of the PGK network, which is 8, is slightly wider
than the random network, which is 7. The PGK network exhibits a more frag-
mented structure with 16 communities, compared to the random graph with 7
communities. The observed PGK network is more widely spread with many struc-
tural pockets compared to a random graph. Also K-core distribution in the two
graphs are strikingly different. In the PGK network, coreness varies from 1 to 7.
Although 52 individuals are located at the periphery (at the bottom strata), mem-
bers of the PGK are distributed in a U shape with slightly heavier loads on the
lower sides. Whereas in the random graph, coreness varies from 1 to 3 and major-
ity of the nodes, 112 out of 140, are located at the core. This shows that the PGK
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network has a hierarchical structure than the random network. Lastly, checking
the number of the cut-point shows that the PGK network has 33 cut-points and
the random graph has only 6 cut-points. Therefore I conclude that the structural
characteristics of the PGK cannot fully explained by the number of people who
participated, nor the number of ties among the participants.
5 Operationalization and Hypotheses
It was somewhat complicated to test the basic tenets implied in the models and to
use those tenets to analyze the data. The question I aimed to answer was how the
structure of the network influenced the organization’s vulnerability and its mem-
bers chances of being subjected to external sanctions. But the distinctions among
different theoretical models do not apply directly to analyses of observed data in
real world. The most fundamental problem is that in many hidden networks, we
don’t see any observed network structure that neatly corresponds to any one type
of model. For example, the structure of Al-Qaeda, one of the largest hidden net-
works, is a combination of all three models, which different models dominating
in different local cells (Sageman 2004; Crossley et al. 2012). This was true for
the PGK, as well. As Figure 16 shows, the largest main component of the 1919
PGK network appears to combine all three types into one structure. Hence, my
independent variables were structural proxies that reflected the implications of the
theoretical models.
At the global network level, structural characteristics are captured through
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Figure 16: Main Component of the PGK Networks in 1919
measures of density, average pathway, diameter, and size. Centrality, density, and
size are widely discussed structural proxies that influence a covert network’s secu-
rity. Still, the influence of centralization is an ongoing debate. Whereas Lindelauf
and his colleagues (2009) argue that covert networks tend to display a high degree
of centralization, Crossley and his co-authors (2012) claim that a decentralized
structure is more secure. Although efficient organizational coordination is impor-
tant for all organizations, the critical role of security for covert organizations sug-
gests that centralization would negatively influence their sustainability. Hence,
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I expected centralization to have a positive influence on security and a negative
association with vulnerability. I operationalized centralization by measuring the
average pathway of a network (Crossley et al. 2012). A shorter average pathway
indicated a more centralized structure.
Regarding density, prior research indicates that an organization is more likely
to survive if it has a loose structure, because loose structures enhance security and
avoid external sanctions (Crossley et al. 2012). Nodes in a covert network tend to
minimize their ties to other members to lower the risk of disposure, and therefore
such networks are less dense and more loosely connected. However, applying this
individual-level interpretation to the macro network level is problematic. As, this
claim contracts to the centralization proposition. This is partly due to density mea-
sure’s sensitivity to other network orders. More importantly, a highly centralized
network tends to have a denser structure, since it requires redundant nodes that
monopolize ties in the network. Hence, I expected that covert network’s density
would have a positive association with its security and a negative association with
its vulnerability. I operationalized density using a conventional calculation: the
number of existing ties in a network divided by the number of the possible ties.
Because covert networks try to hide their structure to maximize security, a
smaller social network is likely to function better than a larger one, while a large
network maximizes vulnerability (Crossley et al. 2012). This argument implies
the importance of two physical characteristics of the network: size and breadth.
To operationalize size, I measured the total number of nodes, and to operationalize
breadth, I measured the network’s diameter, which means the maximum eccentric-
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ity of any node in the network. I expected both variables to be positively related
to vulnerability.
Turning to individual risk, each structural property has a different influence on
how individuals are exposed to the external risk—for example, what they know
about other members, what kind of activity they are willing to undertake, and what
they are capable of. Consequently, an individual’s vulnerability—the likelihood
that he or she will be subject to external sanction—is influenced by the structural
properties of the network in which they are embedded. In any given covert or-
ganization, individual risk is not equally distributed. As Aubert (1982) suggests,
the risk of exposure is not the same for the members at the upper and the lower
echelons of a covert group. In addition, risk is differentially associated with indi-
vidual network properties within an illicit association (Baker and Faulkner 1993).
Therefore, to explore risk distribution at the micro level, I use structural posi-
tion, density, and size as indicators of the structural characteristics of individual
participants.
Structural position of individual node in a covert network is expected to have
a negative association. Hubs are exposed to many other members and also control
the circulation of resources and information. Hence, external authorities target
hubs in their efforts to expunge the covert network. However, in successful covert
organizations, I expected this relationship to be inverted. To sustain organiza-
tional operation, the nodes occupying the central position should be more secure
than those in marginal positions. Hence, in this analysis of a successful covert
organization, I expected structural centrality to be positively related to security in
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general. I calculated the structural position using the k-core score of the node:
a higher k-core score means that the node is located in a more central position
within the sub-network.
I expected density and size to have a negative influence on individual security.
When a node has more connections and more dense connections to other nodes in
a covert network, it becomes vulnerable. Therefore, I expected these two variables
to be positively associated with the vulnerability of the node. I measured density
based on an ego-network of the node at the local level and size by the number of
people the node was connected to.
6 Group-Level Analysis and Findings
Table 7 summaries the variables included in the macro-level analysis. In addition
to the variables introduced in the previous section, I included one control vari-
able to minimize the error term associated with the natural retaining pattern. The
conditions of resistance vary over time, and intensity of activity and demographic
characteristics were certainly different in different years. Although I could not
control all the exogenous factors, I included the number of the naturally retained
people in a given year as an instrumental variable that might capture and com-
pensate for that year’s variance in conditions. If more people were voluntarily
leaving the network in a particular year, that would imply that the conditions for
operation were not encouraging. Hence, I expected non-executed retreatment to
have a positive relationship with the vulnerability of the network.
154
Function Name Operationalization Mean SD
Dependent
Variable
Vulnerability A total number of
members who got





Average Path The average number of
steps along the shortest
paths for all pairs in the
network
2.974 .1142
Diameter The greatest distance
between any pair of
nodes
7.538 .7605
Density The number of existing
ties divided by possible





Size A total number of










Table 7: List of Variables for Linear Regression Model
As Figure 17 shows, the number of people who left the organization by way
of execution is larger than the number who left voluntarily. Also, the number of
people who left voluntarily was relatively constant, compared with the number
of those who were executed. There was little correlation between the voluntary
retainers and executed retainers. To understand how structural characteristics were
associated with vulnerability, I ran a linear regression. Table 8 summarizes the
results.
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Figure 17: Distributions of Withdrawing Members
As I suggested in the previous section, the centralization of this covert organi-
zation was positively related to its vulnerability. As centralization (measured by
the average pathway length) increased, the network’s vulnerability also increased.
The average risk increased as the average pathways became shorter. Density at
the network level negatively influenced vulnerability, which means that a more a
closely connected network structure was less vulnerable to the external sanction.
I also found a positive relationship between magnitude and vulnerability. If the
radius of the covert network was large, it faced more risk. A larger network radius
had a clear positive influence on the network’s vulnerability. The network’s size
was also positively associated with its vulnerability. The larger the network, the
more exposed it was to hazards. All these factors were statistically significant net
of the control variable. Based on these results, I conclude that in the case of the
PGK, more closely connected and decentralized networks were less risky.
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Coefficient Std. Err t P>|t|
Average Path -11.218 4.258 -2.63 0.016
Diameter 2.028 .937 2.16 0.042
Density -3439.989 1245.425 -2.76 0.012
Size .224 .056 3.97 0.001
Not-Executed Retreatment .332 .251 1.32 0.201
Table 8: Linear Regression Model on Group Vulnerability
7 Individual-Level Analysis and Findings
Turning to the micro-level, I now look at individual-level risk distribution. In the
second part of the analysis, I analyzed the observed variance of the risk distribu-
tion within the PGK. My model predicts the vulnerability of individual members
of the covert organization as a function of personal network size, structural po-
sition within the covert network, and the level of individual experience. Table 9
summarizes the variables included in this analysis. In addition to the variables in-
troduced earlier, I added one control variable, the individual’s level of experience.
The strongest alternative account for individual vulnerability is an attritional char-
acteristic: whether the person knows how to avoid the sanction. I assumed that
more experienced members were less likely to be victimized. For the micro-level
analysis, I ran a Logit regression to predict the likelihood of being expected.
The results are presented in Table 10. The empirical evidence is consistent
with my expectations. The results showed that on the micro-level, within the hi-
erarchy of the organization, individuals at the margin were exposed to more risk,
and less-experienced persons were more subject to external intervention. If risk
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who got arrested or
killed






score is divided by
the mean of k-core
score of the exit year
.859 (.626) 0-2.36
Size Number of ties of an
individual node at
the time of exit
5.672 (7.642) 1-56
Density The number of
existing ties divided
by possible ties






Experience Number of years in
the covert network
16.368 (12.40) 1-51
Table 9: List of Variables for LOGIT regression Model
had been uniformly distributed, then individuals would have been equally subject
to external sanctions regardless of their structural position within a given network.
The control variable, experience level, was negatively related to vulnerability: less
experienced participants were at greater risk. In addition, a large and densely con-
nected ego-network was associated with more risk, which supports the claims of
existing research. The size effect should be read with some caution because mem-
bers spend more time in the organization, they tend to have more relationships to
other members. However, these results are statistically significant after control-
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Coefficient Std. Err Z P>|z|
Structural Position -.3276 .1113 -2.94 0.003
Density .0095 .0054 1.75 0.079
Size .1024 .0326 3.14 0.002
Experience -.1537 .0188 -8.16 0.000
Constant 1.4838 .2945 5.04 0.000
Table 10: LOGIT Regression Model on Individual Vulnerability
ling for individual experience, which is the number of years they engaged with the
PGK. 52
Together, these macro-level and micro-level findings help answer the ques-
tion of how the PGK was able to sustain itself in the face of Japan’s aggressive
repression. At the macro level, we saw that loosely connected, wide networks
were at greater risk. At the micro level, sanctions were more likely to affect less-
experienced people who were of less importance to the organization’s sustainabil-
ity. The PGK’s structure secured its core, more experienced members, and this
enabled the PGK to survive throughout the colonial period. These findings show
that covert organizations may have greater sustainability if they maintain struc-
tures that distribute risk unequally. This conclusion highlights the significance of
unequal risk distribution for the survival of covert organizations. 53
52 The relationship between number of degree and the detection time is shown in Appendix H at the
end of this chapter. The graph is generated using 145 active PGK members at 1919. By looking
at the two variables only, people with larger degrees tend to get detected later. Therefore, the
experience control variable is necessary for the model.
53 The social movement literature has rigorously discussed the subject of unequal risk distribu-
tion. Several studies investigate differential consequences for movement participants. For ex-
159
8 Conclusion
The Provisional Government of Korea confronted Japanese authority and faced
severe repression throughout its 27 years of existence. The members of the PGK
had to secure its organizational persistence in the face of severe external threats.
They suffered more casualties in some years than in others. By looking at the
PGK’s relational structures, I explicate the mechanisms by which this covert or-
ganization was able to be so resilient. My findings highlight two important con-
nections between risk and the structure of covert networks. First, structure can
affect the risk of the organization as a whole. Second, and more critically, organi-
zational risk is tied up with the risk to individual members, and the organization’s
structure can affect which individuals are at greatest risk. In the PGK, risk was
systematically distributed unevenly. I show that risk of capture is inversely related
to the structural centrality in the organization. By inducing a relational structure
that allocates risk on the margins of the covert social network, the core and more
experience participants were able to maintain the organization over the course of
three decades.
For most social networks, hubs and a centralized structure efficiently facili-
tate the circulation of resources and information. But this chapter suggests that
clandestine organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. Existing
ample, Fendrich (1977) argues that participation in the civil rights movement had different con-
sequences for the life courses of black and white participants. According to McAdam (1992),
gender also mediated the effects of participation. The present study exclusively investigates
structural homogeneity.
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theory suggests that small groups can act to further their interest much more eas-
ily and efficiently than large ones, but small groups also tend to devote too few
resources to the satisfaction of their common interests.
However the case of the PGK suggests that in covert networks, risk is greatest
for marginal members.and finally that there is a surprising tendency for a greater
numebr of members at the periphery bears a disproportionately large share of the
risk than the participants at the core. Lessons from the case of the PGK can be ap-
plied to other cases, particularly present-day covert networks. Organizations seek
secrecy for a variety of reasons: their activities could be illegal, culturally exclu-
sive, or terrorist, or they could simply represent a political minority. Regardless of
their motivation for maintaining secrecy, covert organizations share the primary
challenge of balancing organizational sustainability with the need to conceal the
organization’s structure. These findings also tell us that heterogeneous risk distri-
bution can enhance a hidden organization’s resilience. By allocating the greatest
risk to the margin, the organization can secure the core and thereby continue to
operate despite external intervention. No matter how many participating members
got caught, as long as they came from the periphery of the organization, the core
members can continue to sustain the organization. In other words, to successfully
deter terrorist networks and criminal organizations, authorities must specifically
target the core rather than randomly attacking low-hanging members.
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APPENDIX G) Degree Distribution of the 1919 PGK
Network
Degree distribution of the PGK 1919 network is presented in the following graphic.
As isolates are not considered, the Min. is 1 and the Max. is 34 with Mean of
5.114 and Median of 3.00.
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This is a study of the people who decisively resisted an unwanted authority. Specif-
ically, this thesis investigates the collective resistance of Koreans under the Japanese
colonial regime. To understand how Korean resistance structures developed and
changed, I investigate the connections between individual action and global-level
movement outcomes. I show how participation, withdrawal, and the structural re-
lations of these processes influenced the growth and decline of Korean resistance
movements. This dissertation brings to light the critical role of social relations
in resistance movements, especially with regard to their evolution and devolution.
To offer a historically grounded explanation of this large-scale social movement,
I investigate the entire periods from the beginning to the end of the Korean re-
sistance movements, and identify several phases of mobilization that characterize
different periods of these social movements’ history.
I developed a structural theory of resistance and used a multifaceted empirical
study of the Korean resistance movement to illustrate this theory. My approach
applied network analysis to the social movement literature and to prosopography.
I used this approach to examine the extent to which the cooperative relationships
of participants yield global structure, bearing the costs of the prohibited collective
action. My dissertation challenges existing explanations of Korean resistance by
arguing that structural constellations were crucial for facilitating the movement
and understanding its sustainability. Using multiple methods, including prosopo-
graphical network analysis and statistical analysis of historical data drawn from
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biographies.
I have shown that relational structure is the key to understanding the rise and
decline of the Korean resistance movement. Historians have long understood that
the Korean resistance movement was a reactive rupture and that this rupture can
be explained by various aspects of colonial control. They have not, however,
taken into account the accumulated oppositional experience of the colonized or the
continuity of the Korean resistance movement. Opposition requires a grievance.
However, once they set in motion, resistance movements operate with an highly
interconnected internal mortar.
2 The Thesis Restated
My dissertation is the first large-scale longitudinal study of relational structures
of resistance movements in an authoritarian regime. The Korean resistance move-
ment against Japanese colonialism is the case of the transition from traditional so-
ciety to modern society, which involves one of the historical moments, mobiliza-
tion of approximately 11% of Korean population for the March First Movement
in 1919. Without understanding of the nascent civil society they are incomprehen-
sible. In part, Korean resistance movements were concocting the transition from
a traditional society where kinship and locality are the dominant mode of social
organization to a more modern society where associational life is playing a critical
role in shaping the interests and identities of actors. This is a study of resistance
movement in that context.
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Two key concepts have served as this study’s main theoretical bases: network
visibility and structural heterogeneity. As I explained in Chapter 3, the relational
structure among participants was pivotal to the continuity of the resistance move-
ment. In fact, seemingly incoherent and heterogeneous movement groups were
connected to one another and orchestrated activities with one another at the mi-
cro level. In spite of the movement’s apparent looseness and diversity, it had a
continuing structural backbone. Social network analysis clarified the movement’s
relational structures. These structures were patterned in such as way as to provide
a window into the dynamic processes of resistance movements. The unity and
continuity of the Korean resistance movement would not have been possible with-
out the integration and interconnectedness of participating individuals and groups.
It is this connectivity that explains simultaneously robust continuity and lo-
cal vulnerability of the Korean resistance movements. Studies of the Korean re-
sistance movement have typically focused on its leadership and on internal con-
flicts among different participating groups. But close investigation of the micro
level reveals the extent to which participants were interconnected and the ways
the movement’s relational structure persisted and changed over time. Including
processes of demobilization in my analysis allowed me to compare mobilization
and demobilization, which yielded novel insights into the evolution and devolu-
tion of Korean resistance. The relational data enabled an innovative description
of the movement that made use of network models. These data also served as an
empirical ground for new theoretical insights into the relationship between con-
tentious networks’ structural composition and mobilization and demobilization in
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a repressive regime.
One of the canonical understandings of Korea of the time is that Korean soci-
ety was completely traditional but of course this kind of mass mobilization could
not arise from completely traditional sources. To mobilize people to the scale
that Korean resistance movements achieved, there has to be rich associational life,
which was less formal, to connect people beyond their kinship networks and local
friendship ties.
From my data, I intended to show the early stage of emerging foundation of
Korean civil society because otherwise it would be not possible to organize move-
ments on that scale. In my data, several agents and activists who were linked
together in a resistance community through the ties arise form the shared edu-
cational training and shared religious experience. With my study of resistance
against destruction of civil society, I found out that the nascent foundations of
associational life made the 1919 possible. The key elements that brought people
together from various backgrounds are religious organizations and educational
system as in the US civil right movement. The study of resistance reveals the
hidden transcripts of the structure of communal society.
The hidden structure that revealed by studying resistance provides a different
image of the Korean society. Of course it was traditional but it was not so com-
pletely traditional. The evidence is that mobilizations go through these networks
of small organizations, clubs, churches, temples, local gatherings, and so on brings
millions of people on the streets. The links outside of kinship and their local ties
connect people to slightly larger communities that enabled them to generate block
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recruitment like in the civil rights movements.
3 Remarks on Cooperative Relationships of Resis-
tance
This study’s findings counter common understandings of cooperative relationship
and invite further thought about the nature of human relations. Participants in the
Korean resistance movement were extraordinarily diverse, and the movement en-
dured an unceasing series of internal disagreements. In this light, the movement’s
continuity is particularly intriguing.
First, the heterogeneity of the participants is remarkable. The shared animos-
ity among the colonized was not conceived in a vacuum. Grievances accrued as a
result of Korean society’s continuously changing economic and political composi-
tion. Hence, the Korean resistance movement was ideologically and strategically
diverse. Participants were affiliated with different hometowns, social classes, ed-
ucational backgrounds, and religious affiliations. Some had no education while
some had doctorates; some were from the underclass while others were part of
the royal family; some were atheist and some were orthodox Christians. The
case of the Korean resistance movement seems to contradict the long-supported
homophily theory of social relations.
One possible explanation for this apparent contradiction lies in the reason for
participants’ cooperation. Stripped to its barest essentials, the purpose of resis-
tance was to remove Japanese colonial control and restore Korean independence.
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In other words, what made resisters join hands was their shared animosity toward
Japanese control over their country. As is often the case, sharing an enemy can be
more important than sharing a friend.
The resistance movement’s internal conflicts do call into question the nature
of its “cooperative relations.” Despite the positive connotation of the adjective,
participants in a “cooperative” group often find it difficult to agree on how and
where to spend financial resources or whom and how to attack. For example, in
1925, Syngman Rhee, who had been serving as the PGK’s provisional president
and later became the first president of Korea, was impeached due to internal dis-
agreement over the bill of trusteeship of the League of Nations. Similarly, Kim
Gu, who served as prime minister of the PGK from 1926 to 1927, suffered from
internal disputes caused by financial difficulties.54
Conflict, however, is in nature of human relationship. Even a romantic rela-
tionship is not free from quarrels, jealousy, or anxiety. Nor were the cooperative
relationships among participants in the Korean resistance movement. The strength
of any kind of relationship arises from shared experiences and critical moments.
Cooperative relations are not immune to internal conflict. On the contrary, pas-
sionate disputes and even prosaic squabbles can be the very source of the bond.
54 The available evidence seems to suggest that other covert movement networks are characterized
by a similar kind of dispute-loaded cooperative relationship. For example, in a study of the
memoirs of Al-Qaeda participants, Shapiro found a high level of internal disagreement: 50% of
disagreements were over tactics, 37% concerned targets, and 35% were over targets. For more
detailed accounts of Al-Qaeda group, please see: The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent
Covert Organizations.
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4 Contribution and Implications
This study investigated relational components of a covert social movement that
sustained itself for more than half a century in non-democratic setting. It showed
how distinctive movement events arose from and influenced relational structures.
I abstracted relational data from biographical texts to identify the structure of the
network linking Korean resistance activists, which has otherwise been difficult
to discern. The power behind the resistance movement’s continuity was the very
connectivity of the participants. They joined hands regardless of differences in
their hometown origins or strategic preferences. This thesis advances our under-
standing of the relational structure of covert collective action in a nondemocratic
setting. Its take-home message, simply stated, is that a heterogeneous network
structure and peripheral participation matter in a covert social movement.
While this study has looked specifically at the Korean resistance movement,
its theoretical framework can be applied to other cases, especially other resistance
movements in nondemocratic regimes, both colonial and authoritarian. Exam-
ples of such resistance movements abound: Polish resistance against Russia, the
Irish Republican Army’s resistance against England, Algerian resistance against
colonial France, and Indian resistance against England are just a few historical
examples. Many more recent oppositional movements fit in this category as well:
the Arab Spring, the Polish social movement against its totalitarian regime (Osa
2003), and revolutionary mobilization in East Germany (Pfaff 1996). It follows, of
course, that the morphological structures that facilitate the success of movements
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under severe repression are likely also the key structural elements that facilitate the
success of organizations we find less attractive, for example, criminal networks,
terrorists, human traffickers, and the like.
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